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Abstract 
 
TransCanada Corporation has proposed the Keystone XL pipeline project to transfer crude 
bitumen from the oil sand fields in northern Alberta, Canada, to oil refineries located in the 
southern part of the United States. This project has created controversy at the national level in 
the US and Canada and at the international level. The existence of various stakeholders with 
differing wants and needs has embroiled the Keystone XL in a complicated strategic dispute. 
This dispute was initially ignited by the potential project’s negative environmental impacts. 
However, economic and political issues have also played a critical role in further complicating 
the decision process. 
The objective of this study is to design a strategic decision-making system for use in assessing 
the Keystone XL conflict with standard and perceptual graph model methods. Standard graph 
model analysis consists of various steps. After identifying the decision makers (DMs) 
subjectively, their options and preferences are determined. Then, possible scenarios or 
combinations of options for these DMs are evaluated.  In the next step, based on rules called 
solution concepts, a standard stability analysis is conducted.  
The perceptual graph model technique, on the other hand, considers the emotions and 
perceptions of DMs in a conflict to assess the existing dynamics among them. Although this 
technique takes its basic structure from the standard graph model technique, it presents unique 
insights into each DM’s perspectives toward the conflict and other DMs. This technique has been 
used in this study to understand how the awareness of one DM regarding other DMs’ perceptions 
can change reactions and strategies under different conditions regarding the Keystone XL 
conflict.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. The Keystone XL Pipeline Project 
The Keystone XL pipeline was first proposed by TransCanada Corporation in 2008 to transfer 
crude bitumen from the oil sand fields in northern Alberta, Canada, to the oil refineries in the 
southern part of the United States (US). As shown in Figure 1.1, this pipeline passes through six 
US states – Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Kansas and Texas –  and is almost 
5576 kilometers in length (3460 kilometers in the US) (Hovey, 2008). Approximately 830,000 
barrels of crude oil a day would be carried from the oil sands of Alberta through the Keystone 
XL pipeline to the Gulf Coast of the US (The New York Times, 2013). 
    Scientists have argue that the Keystone XL project can cause serious harm to the environment, 
such as land ruined by mining, negative effects on biology and water quality, especially in the 
Ogallala aquifer in the Nebraska region, and emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), a critical 
cause of global warming. In addition, huge amounts of water, drawn from rivers such as the 
Athabasca River in Alberta, and energy are needed for the extraction of bitumen from the oil 
sands, which further increase the potential environmental threats of moving forward with the 
Keystone XL pipeline project (Cryderman, 2013).  
In November, 2011, the US Department of State (DOS) pointed out that to satisfy the US 
national interest in the Keystone XL pipeline project, it was necessary to present an in-depth 
assessment of potential alternative routes that would avoid the Sand Hills region in Nebraska. 
Following this, in late December, 2011, Republicans in the US Congress put pressure on 
President Obama to make a decision regarding the Keystone XL pipeline project within 60 days.  
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Figure 1.1: Proposed Routes by TransCanada 
(The above map has been developed based on TransCanada [2012]) 
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In January, 2012, the DOS announced that “there was insufficient time to develop and assess 
information regarding alternative pipeline routes in Nebraska” (TransCanada, 2012). 
Subsequently, TransCanada and Nebraska’s Department of Environmental Quality (NDEQ) 
began cooperating to find an alternative route for the Keystone XL pipeline that would avoid the 
Sand Hills of Nebraska. In April, 2012, alternative corridor options were submitted by 
TransCanada to NDEQ. 
It is anticipated that in the next step NDEQ would evaluate the public comments announced 
by DOS and review the routes. This process takes approximately six to nine months. On May 4, 
2012, TransCanada submitted to the State Department the Presidential Permit Application for 
building the cross border pipeline (TransCanada, 2012). DOS announced that the decision 
making regarding the Keystone XL project would take place by the first quarter of 2013. If it is 
accepted, the construction was expected to start during early 2013, with an anticipated in-service 
date of two or three years (TransCanada, 2012). As of August 2013 a decision has not been 
rendered by the US President. 
Complexity and controversial dimensions of the project contributed to high levels of political 
tension between environmentalists and supporters of the construction of the pipeline. In addition 
to the environmental aspects, other issues such as political and economic challenges have 
contributed to turning this highly charged tension into a struggle for TransCanada, the 
corporation proposing the construction of the pipeline. Usually, the word “conflict” in this 
context refers to a strong diversity of views among decision makers (DMs) that has the potential 
to escalate into serious negative outcomes. However, the current tension arising over the 
Keystone XL pipeline project is a complicated but trade dispute, which reflects a unique form of 
struggle and can be referred to as a “strategic conflict.” 
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After exploring key factors underlying this strategic conflict described in Chapter 2, the 
Keystone XL pipeline dispute is modeled and analyzed using the graph model for conflict 
resolution technique (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). The main DMs, their options, and their relative 
preferences in the conflict are first identified. Then, a stability analysis is conducted to ascertain 
the potential equilibrium states or resolutions, which are stable states for all DMs.  
Inconsistent perceptions, disagreements, and differing preferences among DMs are factors that 
could cause conflicts to occur. In the condition that negative intense emotions or asymmetric 
knowledge exists between the DMs, a perceptual graph model would be more useful for 
assessing the conflict. Furthermore, perceptual stability analysis used in the perceptual graph 
model technique extends beyond standard analysis techniques and gives the opportunity to study 
DMs’ independently perceived perspectives toward the conflict. Moreover, in this technique, the 
awareness of each of the DMs regarding other DMs’ perceptions and recognitions is also 
considered and evaluated systematically.  Therefore, in addition to a standard graph model 
analysis, the perceptual graph model technique has also been used in this study to delve into the 
Keystone XL pipeline from different angles. 
A systematic investigation of the conflict furnishes a better understanding of the dispute, how 
it can be more effectively managed, and other valuable strategic insights. Application of the 
conducted study in the real word, conclusion, and insights are provided to demonstrate the 
efficiency of utilizing the graph model.  
1.2. Motivation for the Research 
Based on current knowledge of climate science, it has become crucial to reduce the emissions 
of     and to replace carbon-based energy with renewable and nuclear energy. Science is 
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seeking alternative technology to generate, distribute, and store electricity effectively. For 
example, creating effective energy storage systems (batteries) with the aid of the sun, wind, 
nuclear energy, and other low-carbon sources is vital to defend the world from the serious 
negative impacts of climate change to the environment, health, ecology, and society (Canadian 
Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 2012b). 
To mitigate global warming concerns, the scientific world has undertaken many related 
initiatives, although these efforts impose enormous pressure on countries’ economies. For 
instance, Norway produces only 3 percent of the fossil fuels of the world. However, it has 
discovered a new technology to eliminate the emission of     in the air. Through this 
technology,     is transferred to a specific device. In the next stage,     is absorbed into a 
chemical element and converted to the liquid form of a chemical substance, which is stored. This 
process shows that fossil fuel can be used without the negative effects of emitting greenhouse 
gases (Black, 2012).  
Before 1970, the link between global warming and greenhouse gas emissions was not 
recognized in oil sands mining projects (Canadian Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways 
Task Force, 2012b). Thus, air and water were considered free and in plentiful supply.  In 
contrast, in today’s projects, there are serious attempts to find technologies consistent with 
reducing water usage and repairing damage to mined lands. Extracting bitumen from oil sands 
using clean energy is preferable to using fossil fuel, since greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
concerns regarding pollution of the Athabasca River would no longer be an issue (Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 2011). In addition, efforts are underway to reduce the amount of 
energy required to extract bitumen from oil sand. 
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Based on current evidence, the Keystone XL pipeline will increase reliance on fossil fuels, 
which contradicts the goal of reducing the negative effects of global warming. This study 
suggests that Canada not only should be aware of the various environmental impacts of its 
proposed pipeline projects, but also should explore possibilities regarding the use of alternative 
energy sources.  
Although the environmental issues associated with the pipeline project are increasingly 
important, current technologies limit TransCanada in proposing and building a completely 
environment-friendly project. On the other hand, the huge financial profits of such projects for 
Canada motivate the country to support attempts to propose and execute them. Therefore, the 
Canadian Coalition, including its industry, provincial governments, and also TransCanada, has 
made multiple attempts to diminish the environmental effects of such projects to gain maximum 
economic profits and produce minimum ill effects on the environment. Moreover, the US, as a 
stakeholder in the Keystone XL project, has taken a complicated stance toward the project; 
supporters and opponents have comprehensively discussed the project’s multiple dimensions in 
previous years, defending their points of view regarding their preferences.  
This study addresses the complexities underlying the Keystone XL pipeline project. Decisions 
of the different stakeholders playing a role in the project are investigated, resulting in an in-depth 
strategic analysis of the situation surrounding this project. Through an assessment of various 
dimensions of this controversial project, its effects on the environments and the economies of the 
two neighboring countries of Canada and the US are discussed.  
Figure 1.2 is the layout for the current thesis and gives a brief scheme of the study conducted 
here. The first two chapters explain the background and literature regarding the Keystone XL 
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pipeline project. Chapters 3 and 4 apply graph model for conflict resolution and perceptual graph 
model techniques to model and analyze the Keystone XL pipeline dispute. Chapter 5 discusses 
the strategic insights, in addition to the limitations, conclusions and future studies of the current 
thesis.  
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1.3. Organization of the Thesis 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Layout of the Thesis 
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Chapter Two: The Framework of the Keystone XL Project 
Strategic Conflict 
2.1. Background 
Increasing trends of human development in technological and industrial sectors have greatly 
raised dependency on oil resources. Although efforts to reduce our dependency on fossil fuel, 
and replace conventional energy sources with renewable ones, such as water, wind, and solar, as 
well as nuclear, have been initiated, oil and similar fossil sources of energy still play a critical 
role in the world. The dependency of the economy on energy hugely increases the importance of 
cheap production and distribution of oil worldwide. Limitations in the availability of energy 
sources and, more significantly, environmental concerns have led to more restrictions on  
producing and using oil, including oil obtained from upgrading bitumen from the oil sands. From 
the perspective of long term sustainability, it has become necessary for industry leaders to 
address environmental impacts together with economic criteria.  
The Keystone XL project is causing political discord among different parties, represented by 
US states, the Obama Administration, influential Republicans, and the Canadian Federal 
government. Each party is using the project to score political or economic gains by adopting a 
nonconforming position. This political discord is analyzed to understand and gain strategic 
insights into how it may evolve. The analysis reveals a systematic approach to design decision 
making to configure a balance among the interests of multiple stakeholders. The following 
framework is proposed to study the reasons and context regarding the causes and consequences 
of this friendly dispute. This study examines three interrelated dimensions consisting of 1) 
environmental-social-health-safety, 2) politics, and 3) economic factors which underlie this 
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controversy. This framework will help to understand the circumstances in the strategic conflict, 
and contribute to constructing the model and analyzing it using the graph model technique.  
2.2. Challenges Raised in the Strategic Conflict  
The background investigation allows one to better appreciate key issues underlying the pipeline 
conflict and to construct a sensible conflict model of the situation as is done in Chapters 3 and 4. 
In this section, the challenges in the different dimensions of environment, politics, and economic 
surrounding the Keystone XL pipeline are discussed. 
2.2.1. Environment-Social-Health Dimension 
Despite TransCanada’s endeavors to achieve the consent of opponents, current events on the 
ground have shown that the Keystone XL project has the potential to create serious 
environmental impacts (O’Rourke, 2013; Parker, 2013). For example, sections of the pipeline in 
the Sand Hills region of Nebraska pass through the Ogallala Aquifer, the largest aquifer in the 
world. This region has very porous soil, shallow groundwater, a high concentration of wetlands, 
broad sand dune formation, and a sensitive ecosystem. The construction of the pipeline would 
potentially create negative consequences for this region, place further stresses on this ecosystem, 
and exacerbate global warming (Parfomak, et al., 2011).  
Climate change and global warming are two extremely vital topics of discussion worldwide, 
mainly resulting from industrial activities and GHG emissions produced by industrialized 
countries (Vormedal, 2010).Consequently, various environmental groups and concerned citizens, 
especially those who live in the Nebraska region along and in proximity to the pipeline, oppose 
this project (Parker, 2013). 
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In March 2008, DOS defended TransCanada’s project, stating that “it increases US market 
access to crude oil supplies from a stable and reliable trading partner, Canada, which is in close 
proximity to the United States” (Department of State, 2008). However, the US National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) stipulates that DOS should investigate and report the 
potential environmental consequences of the proposed Keystone XL project in an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) before announcing the environmental impacts to the public (Parfomak, et 
al., 2011). 
In April 2010, DOS instructed TransCanada to prepare the EIS report. After Cardno Entrix, a 
main consultant of TransCanada, completed the first EIS, the report was delivered to the DOS. 
However, this report received criticisms, namely that it had ignored real environmental impacts 
and presented an optimistic view of the effects of the Keystone XL project (Hayden, 2011).  
In March 2010, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a non-profit environmental 
group in New York, issued a report pointing to a huge disparity between the goal of 80 percent 
reduction in      emissions until 2050 and moving forward with transferring heavy crude oil 
from Alberta, Canada to the Gulf Coast of the US. The NRDC report stated that “the Keystone 
XL pipeline has the potential to increase carbon pollution by 27 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide” (NRDC, 2011). Studies indicate that the average GHG results from importing and using 
unrefined oil sands bitumen in the US is about 6% higher than when using US refined crude oil 
(Government of Canada, 2008).  
In July 2010, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stressed that DOS should study 
“greenhouse-gas emissions, air pollution, pipeline safety, wetlands and migratory-bird 
populations” more adequately with regard to the Keystone XL project (Welsch and Newswires, 
2010). The EPA further pointed out that TransCanada will have to use and heat up underground 
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water and diversions from the Athabasca River in Alberta to extract bitumen from sand. This 
requires large amounts of natural gas and energy. In this process, thirteen chemically dangerous 
elements, such as arsenic and lead, will be released into rivers and aquifers. Since tar sands 
include sulfur and nitrogen, this can lead to the creation of other dangerous substances, such as 
    (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2011). 
The DOS issued an announcement in August 2011, stating that “the pipeline would have no 
significant impact on the environment” (Jr, 2011). This statement ignited several protests in 
Washington, when more than 500 protesters gathered in front of the White House demanding 
that President Obama reject TransCanada’s proposal (Gerken, 2011). 
James Hansen, a leading climate change activist and former NASA scientist, also the head of 
NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York City, warned that global warming is 
not only a prediction, it is real and happening. He was amazed by President Obama’s positive 
opinion about continuing the Keystone pipeline project. Hansen also cautioned that, if Canada 
goes ahead with this project, 20 to 50 percent of the earth will be seriously in danger. He also 
stated in The New York Times: "if Canada proceeds [with oil sands development], and we do 
nothing, it will be game over for the climate." Therefore, he strongly criticized the way that the 
US and Canada are dealing with this issue. However, Joe Oliver, a Canadian politician and 
member of the Conservative Party in the House of Commons of Canada, countered that Hansen’s 
exaggerated comments regarding the effects of the oil sands on the environment are nonsense, 
because the mentioned source of energy represents 1/1000
th
 of global emissions (CBCnews, 
2013; Iranto, 2012). 
Similarly, in September of 2011, nine Nobel peace prize winners, such as the Dalai Lama, 
signed a letter to President Obama asking that he reject the Keystone XL pipeline project. They 
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wrote that “the oil that would flow through the pipeline is dirty, toxic and corrosive.” However, 
Shawn Howard, a spokesman for TransCanada, stated that it could not be certain that the oil in 
other regions in the world is “conflict-free oil” (Payton, 2011). In February of 2010, Alberta’s 
representative in Washington D.C., Gary Mar, declared to the US House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce that the Alberta oil sand industry has strict regulations and standards regarding 
environmental preservation with respect to air, land, water, and wildlife and, more importantly, 
managing GHG emissions (Canadian Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 
2012b). 
In consonance with TransCanada and the Government of Alberta on March 1, 2013, DOS 
released another EIS draft report in response to TransCanada’s latest application of May of 2012 
requesting a Presidential permit. This EIS report reflected public opinion. According to this 
report, the Keystone XL project will have little to no impact on the environment and GHG 
emissions. This announcement has appeased the oil industry and Alberta’s  politicians, and 
further disappointed those who opposed the project (Business Roundtable, 2013). It is expected 
that the DOS will release an addendum report on the Keystone XL in the near future, which will 
influence the Obama Administration’s final decision on this project (The New York Times, 
2013). 
All in all, the US needs to secure its energy resource supply. It has no choice other than to buy 
crude oil from Canada or from other regions including the Middle East. However, the US 
considerably prefers to deal with Canada as its neighboring friend and ally. On the other hand, 
because of worldwide pressure and regulations regarding promoting environmentally sustainable 
industries, the US and Canada are desperate to find ways to address environmental issues in such 
processes as discovering, extracting and transporting energy products.  
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Canada asserts that it has introduced sustainable solutions to multiple environmental 
imperfections regarding the extraction and transportation of oil sands bitumen from Canada to 
the US (Canadian Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 2012a). For example, 
to extract bitumen from land, a technique called Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD) was 
developed. This technique significantly reduces disturbance of land and minimizes freshwater 
use in extraction processes (Canadian Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 
2012a). Moreover, the transportation of the crude oil by trucks and trains is more costly and 
consumes large amounts of fossil fuel, drastically increasing the amount of wasted energy and 
GHG emissions (Parfomak, et al., 2013; Penty and Efstathiou Jr, 2013). TransCanada argues that 
the Keystone pipeline project would decrease GHG emissions. This claim has led to a 
controversial debate among many scholars, policymakers, and environmentalists (Mccarthy, 
2013).  
Through collaborative work by the federal and provincial governments, Canada seriously 
seeks new technologies to combat any negative environmental impacts of the Keystone XL 
pipeline and to gain sustainable resolutions. Nevertheless, other aspects, including politics and 
economic concerns, intensify the complexity of the strategic conflict.  
2.2.2. Political Dimension 
Canada is the only country in the world with large oil reserves that is not a member of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Canada provided fifteen percent of 
the US oil demand in 1998, and nineteen percent in 2008. It is estimated that this percentage will 
rise to 35 percent by 2035. On the other hand, the US accounts for 99 percent of Canada’s oil 
and gas exports. Exporting oil sands bitumen from Canada shortens the supply line and, thus, is 
economically beneficial for the US and Canada. Moreover, the high degree of trust between the 
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two neighboring countries creates an encouraging atmosphere to reaching agreements on issues 
related to energy, shipment and refining (Canadian Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways 
Task Force, 2012b). According to the US federal law, project consultants should have no 
financial or other profits from the projects about which they consult (Hayden, 2011). One of the 
political issues that arose regarding the Keystone XL project was when DOS instructed 
TransCanada to assign contractors to investigate and write the EIS report. TransCanada procured 
the services of Cardno Entrix to review and inspect environmental issues involved in the 
Keystone XL project and to write the EIS report. In October 2011 the hiring of an outside 
contractor to write the EIS and the interaction of DOS and TransCanada gave rise to questions of 
“potential conflicts and bias.” This led fourteen members of the US Congress to request the 
DOS’s Office of Inspector to monitor the process that led to producing the EIS report (Parfomak 
et al., 2011). Critics were worried that TransCanada and Cardno Entrix would have financial 
conflicts of interest, because implementing the project will create large and long-term financial 
profits for Cardno Entrix, which might affect the quality of the report and credibility of 
information and advice it produces. In addition, because TransCanada has paid Cardno Entrix to 
write the report, DOS does not have control and monitoring oversight over the conducted study.  
In a different context, the destiny of the Keystone XL project has become a subject of conflict 
at the national level between the Democratic and Republican Parties in the US. News media 
commentaries indicate that the Keystone XL project has turned into a “political football” in the 
US. One main cause of the dispute is that the Keystone XL is considered an international project, 
which means its approval or rejection is not directly under the authority of the US Congress. 
Regulations require that, for the project to be approved, a presidential permit must be issued and 
announced by DOS. This process requires a comprehensive inquiry into whether the various 
16 
 
aspects of the project satisfy US “national interests.” However, Congress plays an “oversight 
role” through federal environmental organizations and processes (Parfomak et al., 2011). 
As reported by the Cable News Network (CNN), Republicans were trying to force President 
Obama to approve the project even before carrying out an adequate review on the environmental 
impacts of the project. Although there were no doubts about the economic benefits of operating 
the pipeline, it is suspected that the Republicans’ prime objective was to use this project to 
pressure the Democrats during the November 2012 presidential election (Cohen, 2012). On the 
other side of the political spectrum, 50 Democratic members of Congress signed a petition to be 
sent to the Secretary of the DOS in June 2010 to address the importance of investigating such 
areas as clean energy, public health preservation, GHG emissions and climate change (Congress 
of the United States, 2010).  
One of the tipping points of the conflict emerged when President Obama rejected 
TransCanada’s proposal on January 18, 2012. DOS stated that Republicans were trying to pass 
legislation to force the President to render a decision on the project within 60 days. President 
Obama stated: “I’m disappointed that Republicans in Congress forced this decision, but it does 
not change my administration’s commitment to American-made energy,” and “we will continue 
to look for new ways to partner with the oil and gas industry to increase our energy security” 
(Argitis and Loon, 2012). Likewise, he emphasized that:  “the rushed and arbitrary deadline 
insisted on by Congressional Republicans prevented a full assessment of the pipeline’s impact, 
especially the health and safety of the American people, as well as our environment” (Alberts, 
2012). President Obama expressed his disappointment regarding Congressional Republicans who 
pressured him to make such a decision (Argitis & Loon, 2012). Although President Obama 
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rejected the project, he kept his support regarding the project, indirectly requesting modification 
from TransCanada (O’Rourke, 2013). 
Based on many indicators that reflect a close relationship between Canada and the US, to 
avoid the Sand Hills of Nebraska on May 4, 2012 TransCanada submitted an alternative route for 
the pipeline. This provoked numerous negative reactions. For example, some opponents to the 
project stated that it should also be reviewed by an independently elected group that regulates 
utilities, such as the State’s Public Service Commission. Also, on July17, 2012, the Nebraska 
Department of Environmental Quality (NDEQ) released an initial response report regarding the 
alternate route proposed by TransCanada for the Keystone XL pipeline. The report stated that the 
alternate route still goes through sandy soils, which are similar to the Sand Hills of Nebraska. 
The final authority to approve the proposal does not lie with the NDEQ but with the US 
Government (Attorney, 2012).  
Senate Republicans intended to speed up the Keystone XL Pipeline process by pushing DOS 
through its approval and giving it to Congress, but Senate Democrats prevented this procedure 
(Clayton, 2012). Globe and Mail reported that the southern part of the Keystone XL project was 
confirmed and supported by the Third Army Corps district to begin construction. However, 
Canada will have to wait until after the US presidential election to act with regard to the northern 
part (Fawcett, 2012).  
One speculation regarding President Obama’s decision to postpone the response to 
TransCanada’s proposal is that he intended to prevent making such a critical decision before the 
2012 presidential election (The Globe and Mail, 2013). However, Republicans imposed 
pressures in Congress and the media to prevent President Obama from postponing the decision. 
Furthermore, Mitt Romney, who was President Obama’s Republican contender in the election, 
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emphasized that the approval of the Keystone XL pipeline would be the first order of his 
administration (Yakabuski, 2012).  
After months of investigations regarding the Keystone XL project, DOS released an EIS 
report on March 1, 2013, in which it agreed that the project will have little impact on the 
environment. Subsequently, the top Republican in Congress, House of Representatives Speaker 
John Boehner, said that the report “again makes clear there is no reason for this critical pipeline 
to be blocked one more day.” He asserted further that, after four years of waiting and “needless 
delays,” it is time “to stand up for middle-class jobs and energy security and approve the 
Keystone pipeline” (Daly, 2013). Ultimately, Joe Oliver, Canadian politician and member of the 
Conservative party in the House of Commons of Canada in a speech given at Center for 
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC stated that, “Ultimately this comes down 
to a choice. The U.S. can choose Canada — a friend, neighbor and ally — as its source of oil 
imports, or it can choose to continue to import oil from less friendly, less stable countries with 
weaker — or perhaps no — environmental standards” (CBCnews, 2013). 
After DOS’s March 2013 EIS announcement, The New York Times published an editorial 
against the Keystone XL pipeline on March 10. It stated that “saying no to the pipeline will not 
stop Canada from developing the tar sands, but it will force the construction of new pipelines 
through Canada itself. And that will require Canadians to play a larger role in deciding whether a 
massive expansion of tar sands development is prudent. At the very least, saying no to the 
Keystone XL will slow down plans to triple tar sands production from just under two million 
barrels a day now to six million barrels a day by 2030” (The New York Times, 2013). 
The rejection of the Keystone XL project in January of 2012 by President Obama has further 
complicated the relationship between Canada and the US. The Prime Minster of Canada stated 
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that “this is clearly the biggest infrastructure project on the continent, and once the election is 
settled, we believe it will be approved” (Efstathiou, 2012). But, he emphasized that, if the US 
does not approve the project this time, Canada will probably diversify its energy exports to Asia, 
a decision that would not favor US interests at all. Even before proposing the alternative route in 
May of 2012, he mentioned on April 2, 2012 that Canada’s decision regarding shipping oil to 
Asia is a viable option. He highlighted that after the rejection of the Keystone XL project by 
President Obama in January of 2012, Canada realized that it should not rely on one customer, by 
which he meant the US. This could be the reason for the Prime Minister’s various visits to China, 
Japan, Thailand, South Korea and other Asian countries right after the US’s decision to reject the 
project (ICTMN, 2012; Potter, 2012).  
According to a study conducted by the Alberta government in 2005, Asian markets are ready 
to pay large amounts of money for Canada’s diesel-rich bitumen components, which would 
represent substantial revenue for Canada (Canadian Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways 
Task Force, 2012b). In addition, 74.7 percent of Canadians concur with diversifying Canada’s 
markets by shipping energy resources to Asian markets (Nanos and Thompson, 2012). However, 
many environmentalists, and concerned citizens in Canada and the US are opposed to the whole 
idea of the Keystone XL project (Perdomo and Vieira, 2012).  
In line with the decision to diversify markets, Canada is actively pursuing another project 
entitled the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines, which would transfer oil sands bitumen to the 
coasts of British Columbia (BC) to be exported by oil tankers to Asian markets (ICTMN, 2012; 
Potter, 2012). In regards to this project, the US Department of Energy stated that because of 
“short marine distances to major northeast Asia markets, future expected growth there in refining 
capacity, and increasing ownership interests by Chinese companies especially in oil sands 
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production” (Ensys Energy, 2010, p. 118), the pipeline to the BC coast would surely be used. 
This would cause some of Canada’s crude oil to be transferred to Asia instead of the US. In turn, 
the balance of the market would change and consequently negatively affect the US because of its 
increased dependency on import from other sources than Canada (Ensys Energy, 2010).  
All in all, Canada’s announced intentions to diversify the crude oil market to the Asian 
markets is considered to be a leverage Canada is using to pressure the US administration to give 
presidential approval regarding the project. By proposing to transfer Alberta oil sands bitumen to 
the US, the Keystone XL pipeline project has become a serious controversial topic in the US and 
Canada. Unquestionably, the political conflicts at the national level in the US and Canada’s 
actions at the international level have seriously affected the dynamics of the diplomatic 
relationship between these two neighboring countries (Efstathiou, 2012). 
2.2.3. Economic Dimension 
Although extending the pipeline from Alberta to the West Coast of the US has caused many 
protests by environmentalists, fishermen and aboriginal groups, it has been shown to provide an 
enormous business opportunity for investors, producers and developers (Canadian Academy of 
Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 2012a). The Government of Canada estimates that if 
the Keystone XL project is approved, close to one hundred thousand jobs per year will be created 
in the US between 2010 and 2035. With increased pipeline capacity, this number could increase 
by 60 percent. There are huge immediate economic benefits, about 100 to 600 million dollars 
annually, that could potentially be gained as a consequence of transporting and processing oil 
sands bitumen in refineries located in Gulf Coast of the US (Hudson, 2013). Exporting oil sands 
bitumen from Canada shortens the supply line and, thus, is economically beneficial to the US. 
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A study conducted by the US Department of Energy Security in 2011 showed that Canada’s 
oil sands could help eliminate US dependency on imports from other suppliers such as 
Venezuela and the Middle East. Amid a congressional hearing in December 2011, 
TransCanada’s president stated that “Keystone XL will bring many benefits to the United States, 
but I believe the most important role that the Keystone will play is to bring energy security to the 
United States during what has been recently some very unsettling times overseas” (Clayton, 
2012). 
Those who oppose the project claim that oil prices in the Midwest of the US will increase if 
the project is executed. They believe that, “rather than providing the US with more Canadian oil, 
Keystone XL will simply shift oil from the Midwest to the Gulf Coast, where much of it can be 
exported to international buyers – decreasing US energy supply and increasing the cost of oil in 
the American Midwest” (Clayton, 2012). 
In the case that the Keystone XL project is approved, TransCanada would lose 14 to 63 
million dollars a year due to tax increases in the US, in addition to the maintenance and 
preservation costs of the constructed pipelines and facilities. However, overall the Keystone XL 
project would be financially beneficial for Canada (Moore, 2012). It is estimated that for each 
dollar invested in the oil sands project, there is a return of nine dollars. Out of that nine dollars, 
six dollars would stay in Alberta while the remainder would go to other areas of Canada, the US, 
and the world (Canadian Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 2012a). 
The Keystone XL project would be economically favorable for Canadian oil sands producers 
and the US Gulf Coast refineries. Through the Keystone XL project, Canadian producers would 
expand their market to the Gulf Coast region and increase their opportunity to bargain over the 
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price of the crude oil because of the several high capacity refineries operating there. 
Subsequently, they could sell their oil at higher prices (Parfomak et al., 2011).  
Canada’s industry is seeking ways to increase its profits from energy projects such as the 
Keystone XL project. Thus, like many oil producing companies in countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, Canadian companies tend not to rely solely on exporting unrefined energy 
resources to the international markets. The better option is to refine energy resources in Canada 
and then ship them to markets to increase the value and price of those products (Canadian 
Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 2012a). This issue was raised during a 
seminar held in the School of Public Policy at the University of Toronto, at which Alberta’s 
envoy to Washington, D.C., David Manning, was asked why Canada does not build refineries in 
Alberta to diminish the environmental impacts of the Keystone XL project, in addition to gaining 
more economic benefits from it. Transferring clean oil through the pipeline can to a large extent 
reduce concerns about global warming. However, Mr. Manning made it clear that, despite the 
environmental and long-term financial advantages of refining the oil in Canada, this plan is 
undoable because of the very high costs and investments it would demand. Consequently, 
Canada does not have a short-term plan to build refineries in Alberta and will be transferring the 
oil sands bitumen to the US Gulf Coast to be refined.  
Although the Keystone XL project seems to be economically beneficial for the US, the project’s 
financial benefit for Canada should be investigated from both short- and long-term perspectives. 
Canada can build pipelines to the US to ship unprocessed bitumen to under-utilized refineries to 
be upgraded. This will ensure quick short-term profits for oil sand companies, the Alberta 
Government, and Federal Government. However, if Canada tries to upgrade the bitumen in 
Canada, capturing “more than $60 billion per year in value-added products and commensurate to 
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jobs in Canada,” it would enjoy the long-term benefits of the Keystone XL project (Canadian 
Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 2012b). Figure 2.1 gives a historical 
summary of important occurrences that have provoked the strategic conflict regarding the 
Keystone XL project. Following the numbers on the figure step by step, the trend of the 
occurrences of this conflict can be better understood. 
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Figure 2.1: Chronology of the Keystone XL Conflict 
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Chapter Three: Graph Model for Conflict Resolution  
Uncertainty in the economic gains and the extent of potential environmental degradation, 
catalyzed by the political bickering between Republicans and Democrats, contributed to creating 
mistrust among various stakeholders, and has led to brewing strategic conflict at the local and 
international levels in the US and Canada. The Keystone XL pipeline conflict is being studied 
using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Appendix A), introduced by Fraser and Hipel 
(1979). This technique is unique in providing a detailed model of the dispute among decision 
makers (DMs). All formal definitions of this chapter explained in Appendix A. 
The graph model technique consists of two parts: modeling and analysis. In the first step, the 
DMs are identified. In the Keystone XL case study, DMs have been categorized as critical and 
influential. Next, the possible options, feasible states and unilateral transitions of each DM 
through the states must be constituted. DMs’ preferences and outcomes are ranked from the most 
to the least preferred for each DM. This ranking is carved out through a subjective process. In the 
second step of the graph model technique, stability analysis using logical rules that describe 
DMs’ strategic interactions are applied to every outcome in the conflict model. These rules are 
called solution concepts and have been defined in the stability analysis section of the current 
thesis.  
The graph model technique can potentially help to improve the decision-making procedure in 
conflicts. Through the use of the model, a better understanding of the options and preferences of 
all DMs is developed, further enhancing negotiation options and increasing the probability of 
win/win solutions (Hipel and Obeidi, 2005). The model used in this study was developed before 
the US presidential election in November 2012. Therefore, as a future study, a comparison 
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analysis between the model’s results and the real actions of DMs could also be conducted after 
the announcement of the final response regarding the Keystone XL project.  
3.1. The Graph Model of the Keystone XL Conflict 
After the exploring key factors underlying the Keystone XL conflict, the evolution of the 
decision-making procedure is modeled and analyzed using the graph model technique (Hipel et 
al., 1997). The first step in modeling the Keystone XL conflict is to list the main and influential 
DMs. As summarized in Table 3.1, President Obama and Canadian Coalition are the main DMs, 
while Congressional Republicans and NDEQ are the influential DMs.  
The main DMs are those who have the authority to decide about the project. The combinations 
of DMs’ strategies develop the states, and the collection of all feasible combinations creates all 
feasible states. In this case, President Obama and the Canadian Coalition (consisting of the 
Federal Government of Canada, TransCanada, and Alberta Government) are the main DMs. The 
US and Canada are in agreement about the need and importance of constructing the pipeline. 
However, some significant details and circumstances, such as environmental concerns, 
surrounding the Ogallala aquifer and Athabasca River, and the dynamics of political rivalry 
during the US 2012 presidential election, are causing disagreement between these two main 
DMs.  
Influential DMs include political parties, organizations, involved groups and states, such as 
the US Congress, DOS, NDEQ non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Oklahoma, Kansas, 
Nebraska, Montana, South Dakota and Texas, fishermen, Canada’s First Nation community and 
lobbyists. Although parties in this category have no authority to make a final decision on the 
project, they have the ability to influence it indirectly through lobbing and exerting political 
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pressure on the main DMs. To develop a simpler and more sensible model, the Congressional 
Republicans and NDEQ, the most influential DMs, have been selected as representatives of the 
influential DMs. Republicans represent supporters of the Keystone XL pipeline project, while 
NDEQ represents opponents and parties who put pressure on the main DMs to resolve 
environmental concerns completely before granting a presidential permit.  
As of September 2012, when the model was developed, there were six options for the DMs. 
Since an option can be chosen or not, the six options produce 2
6
 states which represent all 
combinations of options that may occur. Therefore, each state refers to a combination of 
decisions that could be made by the DMs. As shown in Table 3.1, each of the main DMs has two 
options. President Obama could approve the project as it has been proposed or with minor 
modifications. The other option is to request major modifications from the Canadian Coalition. 
Not selecting either of these options means that President Obama intends to reject the project.  
Canadian Coalition would start building the project if the President approves it or agrees to 
modify the project if the President requests such modification (Option 2). In the case that the 
Canadian Coalition accepts modification it will have to propose another route by studying 
different aspects of the route, especially the environmental impacts. Consequently, the Canadian 
Coalition should apply again for a US presidential permit. But when options three and four in 
Table 3.1 are not chosen by Canadian Coalition, it means that Canada will stop insisting on 
working with the US and think about other customers like Asia.  
Option five addresses Republicans’ pressures on their political opponent (Democratic Party) 
to approve the project. Due to the enormous economic potential of the project, Republicans 
strongly support the project and have been chosen in the current study as the representative of the 
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Keystone XL project’s supporters. As an example, these supporters include the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the nation’s largest 
federation of unions (Greenhouse, 2013). 
Option six refers to NDEQ which has an influential role as a moderate environmentalist to 
pressure President Obama to adequately address the environmental impacts of the project rather 
than immediately approving it. The priority of this DM and other environmentalists is that the 
construction of the pipeline not be approved.  
Table 3.1: The DMs and Their Options 
DMs Options 
President Obama 
1- Approve the Keystone XL pipeline project (Approve) 
2- Request major modifications from the Canadian Coalition (Major 
Modification) 
Note: When President Obama does not choose Options 1 and 2, it means that 
he is rejecting the project 
Canadian Coalition 
3- Build revised project as of May 2012 (Build)  
4- Accept major modifications (Modify)  
Note: When Canada does not choose Options 3 and 4, it means that the 
project is canceled  
Republicans 5- Pressure the President to approve the project (Pressure)  
NDEQ 
6- Pressure to stop the project, otherwise reduce and even eliminate all 
environmental impacts (Pressure to Solve or Stop)  
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3.2. The Set of Feasible and Infeasible States 
A strategy describes a DM’s decision made based on the set of options of that particular DM 
(Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour, 1993, p. 9). After selection of the strategy by each DM, the 
combinations of DMs’ strategies constitute the states. Table 3.2 illustrates the option form which 
contains information regarding options of DMs, each DM’s strategy and all the developed states, 
which have been indicated by a number in the bottom of the table. As shown in Table 3.2, Y 
means “yes”, showing the situation where the option has been chosen by the DM. On the other 
hand, N indicates “no”, which describes the situation where the option has not been selected. For 
example, state one is formed as (NN NN N N), in which the first two “N”s represent the strategy 
selected by President Obama. Notice that a DM can make transitions to other states while other 
DMs’ strategies do not change. So, President Obama can move in the conflict model from state 5 
to 6 since this transition does not require Canadian Coalition, Republicans and NDEQ to change 
their strategies. 
After identifying the DMs and their options, states that are deemed impossible to materialize 
because of the logical impediments presented by the particular combination of options are called 
infeasible states and removed from the model. Combinations of options that are mutually 
exclusive create one form of logically infeasible outcomes (Fang et al., 1993, p. 34). From the 64 
possible states only 24 of them are feasible or acceptable. For example, in Table 3.1, the US 
cannot accept the operation of the project and request major modification at the same time. In 
other words, from all of the options that the President has, only one option can be chosen at a 
time. This condition is the same for the Canadian Coalition, which has more than one option. 
Therefore, Canadian Coalition cannot choose Options 3 and 4 as its strategy at the same time. 
Stated alternatively, if President Obama decides to choose his second option (i.e., Modify) by 
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means of eliminating the environmental impacts, TransCanada needs to propose a new report 
(i.e., choose Option 4), and thus cannot start the construction (i.e., choose Option 3). 
Consequently, Options 2 and 3 cannot occur simultaneously.  
Investigating direct specification is another method for finding infeasible states. It refers to 
preferentially infeasible outcomes for a DM that results from strategies chosen by other DMs. 
For example, if the US does not opt for both Options 1 and 2 (accept the proposal or 
modification), then it necessarily rejects the project. In this situation, the Canadian Coalition will 
not choose Options 3 or 4, thereby canceling the project.  
By systematically eliminating states that are deemed to be unreasonable or unlikely to occur, 
many infeasible states were dropped from the model. Only twenty-four states are considered 
feasible as shown in Table 3.2 and explained in Table 3.3. Some of the feasible states are 
intermediary states. For example, according to state 5 or 11 in Table 3.3, while the project is 
being modified by Canadian Coalition, President Obama approves the project. The assumption in 
this study is that if President Obama approves the Keystone XL project, Canadian Coalition 
would take action and start the operation. Thus, states 5 and 11 are in-between states from when 
the project is approved by President Obama to when the construction of the pipeline is started by 
Canadian Coalition. Also state 24 is status quo and represents the current situation. Canadian 
Coalition modified the project due to President Obama’s requisitions. Pressures from both 
Republicans and NDEQ continued. 
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Table 3.2. Standard Option Form 
President Obama 
1-Approve N N Y N Y N N N Y N Y N N N Y N Y N N N Y N Y N 
2- Modify N Y N N N Y N Y N N N Y N Y N N N Y N Y N N N Y 
Canadian Coalition 
3-Build N N Y N N N N N Y N N N N N Y N N N N N Y N N N 
4-Modify N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 
Republicans 
5-Pressure N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
NDEQ 
6-Pressure to 
Solve or Stop 
N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State 
Numbers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
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Table 3.3: Description of States 
States Explanation 
1 
The project is rejected by the US. The Canadian Coalition refuses to set up the project. 
No pressures from influential DMs exist. However, the results would favor the NDEQ. 
2 
Canada refuses to set up the project if the US requests major modification. No pressures 
from influential DMs exist. 
3 
Canada sets up the project due to acceptance by President Obama. No pressures from 
influential DMs exist. 
4 
President Obama rejects the proposal in the middle of modification by the Canadian 
Coalition. No pressures from influential DMs exist. 
5 
President Obama accepts the proposal while the project is being modified by the 
Canadian Coalition. No pressures from influential DMs exist. 
6 
The request of modification from the US is accepted by Canada. No pressures from 
influential DMs exist. 
7 
The project is rejected by the US. The Canadian Coalition refuses to set up the project. 
Republicans oppose this decision and continue to pressure. 
8 
Canada refuses to set up the project if the US requests major modification. Republicans 
pressure the President to accept the project. 
9 
Canada sets up the project due to acceptance by President Obama.  Republicans 
pressure may have influenced this decision. 
10 
President Obama rejects the proposal in the middle of modification by the Canadian 
Coalition. Pressure comes only from Republicans, because they oppose this decision. 
11 President Obama accepts the proposal while the project is being modified by the 
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Canadian Coalition. Republican pressure may have influenced this decision. 
12 
The request by the US for modification is accepted by Canada. Pressure to accept the 
project comes only from Republicans. 
13 
The project is rejected by the US. The Canadian Coalition refuses to set up the project. 
One of the variables of President Obama’s decision is pressure from the NDEQ on the 
US to abandon or completely resolve environmental concerns caused by the project. 
14 
Canada refuses to set up the project if the US requests major modification. One of the 
variables of President Obama’s decision is pressure from the NDEQ on the US to 
abandon or completely resolve environmental concerns caused by the project. 
15 
Canada sets up the project due to acceptance by President Obama in spite of the 
NDEQ’s objection. 
16 
President Obama rejects the proposal in the middle of modification by the Canadian 
Coalition. This may have been under pressure from the NDEQ. 
17 
President Obama accepts the proposal while the project is being modified by the 
Canadian Coalition in spite of NDEQ’s objection. 
18 
The request by the US for modification is accepted by Canada. One of the variables of 
this decision is pressure from the NDEQ on the US to abandon or completely resolve 
environmental concerns caused by the project. 
19 
The project is rejected by the US. The Canadian Coalition refuses to set up the project. 
Existence of pressure from influential DMs affects the DMs’ opinions. 
20 
Canada refuses to set up the project if the US requests major modification. Consistent 
pressures applied by influential DMs surround President Obama. 
21 Canada sets up the project due to acceptance by President Obama. The NDEQ is not 
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satisfied with the result. Republican pressure may have influenced this decision. 
22 
President Obama rejects the proposal in the middle of modification by the Canadian 
Coalition. Consistent pressures applied by influential DMs surround President Obama. 
23 
President Obama accepts the proposal while the project is being modified by the 
Canadian Coalition in spite of the NDEQ’s objection. Republican pressure may have 
influenced this decision. 
24 
The US request for modification is accepted by Canada. Existence of pressure from 
influential DMs affects DMs’ opinions. (Status quo) 
 
 
3.3. Decision Makers’ Preferences 
As the last step of modeling, DMs’ preferences in the conflict over feasible states are ordinally 
ranked from the most to the least preferred as illustrated in Table 3.4 (from left to right). Equally 
preferred states are indicated by a line drawn on top of the numbers. President Obama’s priority 
is to proceed with the operation of the pipeline (i.e., choosing Option one). However, acceptance 
of the project could be conditional (i.e., requesting some minor modifications from 
TransCanada) to show some attention to environmentalists’ concerns. If the US selects the 
second option, it prefers that Canada modifies the project before the US reviews the application 
again for a final decision. On the other hand, the US is not at all in favor of Canada ignoring the 
request and transferring oil sands bitumen to Asia.  
The Republicans strongly insist that the project receives approval from the President for many 
reasons, most importantly the economic benefits of the Keystone XL pipeline (O’Rourke, 2013). 
Before the US elections, both sides, including the Democratic and Republican parties, used every 
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opportunity to pressure each other, and the Keystone XL project was one of the critical topics in 
their debates. Thus, whichever action President Obama might take regarding the project, 
Republicans would find ways to pressure him. This issue became more complex when President 
Obama actively sought to keep the support of environmentalists to enhance his reelection bid for 
another four years. In any case, President Obama is not in favor of the pressure imposed on him 
by the Republicans and the other proponents of the project. 
In contrast, the Canadian Coalition welcomes support from the Republicans. For many 
reasons, the Coalition resists the NDEQ’s pressure to stop or impose delays on the project. First, 
Canada can use the Republican pressure on President Obama to accept the project, advertising 
the fact that nearly half of the US population supports the project. On the other hand, Canada 
would prefer that the NDEQ become convinced that the project poses no serious danger to the 
environment. If this happens, the NDEQ would not impose any pressure to stop the project, and 
Canada’s status would be further enhanced. Yet another issue for Canadian Coalition is the need 
for Canada to exhibit an environmentally friendly stance to enhance its worldwide reputation.  
Both the Republican and the Democrat parties in the US oppose Canada’s decision to export 
oil sands bitumen to Asian countries, such as China. This issue, added to the many other 
variables in this strategic conflict, presents an even more challenging factor for President Obama 
in making a decision. On the other hand, Canada uses the issue of exporting oil to China as 
leverage to convince the US to accept the proposal despite environmentalist pressures.  
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Table 3.4: Ranking the States Based on Preferences of DMs from the Most (Left) to Least (Right) 
  
DMs Ranking of States 
President 
Obama 
3 5 6 15 17 18 9 11 12 21 23 24 1 13 7 19 4 10 16 22 2 8 14 20 
Canadian 
Coalition 
3 9 21 15 5 11 23 17 6 12 24 18 8 2 20 14 17 1 19 13 10 4 22 16 
Republicans 9 21 3 15 11 23 5 17 12 24 6 18 7 1 19 13 10 22 4 16 8 20 2 14 
NDEQ 13,16 14 19,22 20 7,10,1,4,8,2 18 24 6,12 17 15,21,23 5,11,3,9 
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As mentioned earlier, the US is the most important oil customer of Canada  (Government of 
Canada, 2008). TransCanada has waited almost five years and proposed a new report about how 
to resolve the environmental impacts even after President Obama’s rejection in January of 2012. 
Therefore, Canada’s priority is for the project to not be rejected again. Canada prefers that the 
US accepts the project directly without requesting any other modifications. Otherwise, if the US 
requests major modifications that Canada is willing to accept, TransCanada will have to pay 
more maintenance costs for its current facilities and existing pipeline until the new project is 
approved and the modifications are completed. The development of Alberta’s oil sands and 
TransCanada’s pipeline are indicators of Canada’s intention to become an energy superpower in 
the world, and the sooner the project is approved, the sooner Canada can get closer to reaching 
this goal.  
The NDEQ represents environmentalists, who put environmental concerns as a high priority. 
Therefore, it is natural that their priority is different from other DMs. Many controversial 
discussions have occurred regarding the potential for serious environmental damages caused by 
the Keystone XL. Although environmental extremists do not want the project to proceed under 
any circumstances, the moderates, whom the NDEQ represents, believe that, if the project is to 
be implemented, its environmental problems must be resolved. The environmentalists also try to 
convince countries to change their perspectives and to enhance technologies in terms of using 
renewable energy rather than fossil fuel. This perspective can be of critical importance in a world 
in which global warming and the melting of the ice in the poles are serious issues. It is also clear 
that, due to national political reasons in the US, Republicans would prefer that the 
environmentalists’ influence on the Obama administration continues.  
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3.4. Representing the Strategic Conflict Using the Graph Form 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the integrated graph model for the Keystone XL strategic conflict. The 
graph model helps in illustrating a better sense of DMs’ movements through the feasible states. 
The numbers shown at the nodes refer to the feasible states presented in Table 3.2. The arcs 
represent state transitions for each DM’s unilateral moves from one state to another, which occur 
when a particular DM makes a selection from the options it controls. Although Figure 3.1 shows 
all movements (including improvements and disimprovements) for all DMs, in reality, when 
transitioning from one node to the other, the DMs consider their preferences and tend to move to 
more favorable states. These transitions are called unilateral improvements (UIs).  
The graph model gives a better sense of players’ movements toward their preferred feasible 
states. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, President Obama could have a transition from state 18 to state 
17, which reflects the DM’s preference of state 17. After the transition to state 17, Canadian 
Coalition could move to state 15, while Republicans would prefer to progress from state 15 to 
state 21. Since at state 21 none of the DMs can improve to a more preferred state, this state is 
stable for all the DMs. But state 21 is less preferred for President Obama than the original state, 
state 18. Thus, the improvement of President Obama from state 18 to 17 could eventually put 
him in a worse situation (state 21). According to a definition in graph model technique, states 
like 18 are called sequentially sanctioned for a particular DM. Therefore, although in some 
instances a DM can make transitions to more preferred states in the initial steps, it is better not to 
move from these sequentially sanctioned states since the DM ends up in a worse situation. In this 
case, state 18 is sequentially sanctioned for President Obama.  
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Figure 3.1: Integrated Graph Form 
DM1: President Obama, DM2: Canadian Coalition, DM3: Republicans, DM4: NDEQ. Note: The relations 
between the arcs are all bidirectional. 
 
  
40 
 
3.5. Stability Analysis of the Keystone XL Strategic Conflict 
After ranking the states according to DMs’ preferences in order to model the Keystone XL 
pipeline conflict, unilateral improvements (UIs) for each DM are identified. Each DM may be 
able to improve to a more preferred state even if the other DMs do not change their strategies. As 
an example, Canadian Coalition’s UI from state 5 to 3 is presented in Table 3.5. Since the other 
DMs do not change their strategies between these two states, Canada could improve unilaterally 
to a more preferred state (state 3). 
Table 3.5: Example of a Unilateral Improvement (UI) for the Canadian Coalition 
DMs State 5 
More preferred state for 
Canadian Coalition  
(State 3) 
President Obama 
1 1 
0 0 
Canadian Coalition 
0 1 
1 0 
Republicans 0 0 
NDEQ 0 0 
      
      Based on a set of solution concepts explained in Table 3.6 (Fang et al., 1993), Table 3.7 
reflects the studied conflict in the tableau form of the graph model. This table contains much of 
the information needed for analyzing the conflict. Stability analysis is conducted using the 
decision support system, GMCRII, to determine stable and unstable states solution concepts are a 
set of rules for modeling moves and countermoves of DMs in the conflict (formal definitions of 
UI 
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solution concepts and examples of using GMCRII software are expressed in Appendix A). They 
describe possible human behaviors during conflict. For instance, according to Table 3.7 and 
Nash stability’s definition (i.e. a state is rational for a DM when the “focal DM cannot 
unilaterally move to a more preferred state”) in Table 3.6, it is preferred and rational for 
Republicans to stay at state 9, since it is more preferred to state 3 which Republicans could move 
to unilaterally. Also, state 7 is more preferred to state 8 for President Obama. Thus, it is rational 
for him to stay at state 7 rather than unilaterally move to state 8. In Table 3.7, rational states for 
each DM have been shown by “R”. 
Table 3.6: Solution Concepts (Obeidi, et al., 2005) 
Solution concepts Stability description 
Nash stability (R) 
“A focal DM cannot unilaterally move to a 
more preferred state” 
General metarationality (GMR) 
“All of the focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are sanctioned by subsequent 
unilateral moves by others” 
Symmetric metarationality (SMR) 
“All of the focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are still sanctioned even after a 
possible response by this DM” 
Sequential stability (SEQ) 
“All of the focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are sanctioned by subsequent 
unilateral improvements by others” 
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Table 3.7: Stability Analysis Tableau Form for the Keystone XL Pipeline (the symbols applied in this table have been summarized in Table 3.8)
President Obama 
Overall 
stability 
X X X X X X X X E E X X X X X E X X X X X X X X 
Player 
stability 
R R S R R S R R S R R U R R R R U U U U U U U U 
Preference 
vector 
3 5 6 15 17 18 9 11 12 21 23 24 1 13 7 19 4 10 16 22 2 8 14 20 
UIs 
  5   17   11   23     5 11 17 23 1 7 13 19 
                6 12 18 24     
Canadian Coalition 
Player 
stability 
R R R R U U U U R R R R U U U U R R R R U U U U 
Preference 
vector 
3 9 21 15 5 11 23 17 6 12 24 18 8 2 20 14 7 1 19 13 10 4 22 16 
UIs     3 9 21 15     12 6 24 18     7 1 19 13 
Republicans 
Player 
stability 
R R U U R R U U R R U U R S R U R R U U R R U U 
Preference 
vector 
9 21 3 15 11 23 5 17 12 24 6 18 7 1 19 13 10 22 4 16 8 20 2 14 
UIs   9 21   11 23   12 24  7  19   10 22   8 20 
NDEQ 
Player 
stability 
R R R R R R U S U S S S R R S S R R R R U U U U 
Preference 
vector 
13 16 14 19 22 20 7 10 1 4 8 2 18 24 6 12 17 15 23 21 5 11 3 9 
UIs       19 22 13 16 20 14   18 24     17 23 15 21 
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In some cases, although the DM’s true intention is to improve to a better state, the 
consequence of its unilateral improvement may not be in its favor since it may give the 
opportunity to the other DMs to unilaterally improve despite its disagreement. As an example, if 
the Republicans improve from state 1 to 7, NDEQ would prefer to unilaterally improve to state 
19. In this situation, it is rational for both President Obama and the Canadian Coalition to stay at 
state 19. As is shown in Table 3.6, state 19 is less preferred for Republicans than states 1 and 7. 
Therefore, state 1 is considered not Nash stable but stable for the Republicans under the 
definition sequential stability. In Table 3.7 sequentially sanctioned states for each of the DMs 
have been shown by “S”. States indicated by “U” represent unstable states for a particular DM. 
In these states, the DM has the opportunity to improve to another state. For example, the 
Canadian Coalition can improve from state 23 to state 21, since the former is less preferred for 
all DMs, thus making state 23 unstable.  
After identifying the stability of individual states for each DM, equilibrium states (overall 
stability) are identified. The states that are stable for all the DMs are defined as equilibrium 
states, shown by “E” in Table 3.7. The remaining states that have been indicated by “X” 
represent states that are instable for at least one DM. The symbols applied in Table 3.7 have been 
summarized in Table 3.8.  
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Table 3.8: Symbols Applied in Table 3.7 
Symbols Description 
UI Unilateral Improvement 
R Nash Stability (R) or Rational State 
S Sequentially Sanctioned State 
U Unstable State 
E Equilibrium State 
X Not Equilibrium 
 
Table 3.9 lists the stability analysis of the Keystone XL strategic conflict, which shows that 
states 19 and 21 are stable for all DMs under all solution concepts (Appendix A). Other states are 
stable under some but not all solution concepts. In Table 3.9, state 21 (one of the equilibrium 
states) describes the situation in which, despite NDEQ’s insistence for the elimination of 
environmental impacts, President Obama approves the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline.  
States 19 and 21 represent consistent strategies by influential DMs and vacillating strategies by 
the main DMs. In state 21, US’s decision appeases Canada Coalition and Republicans, while in 
state 19, US’s decision appeases NDEQ. 
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Table 3.9: Stability Analysis   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
States 19 and 21 represent enforcement from influential DMs. Republicans try to push President 
Obama to move toward accepting the project, while the NDEQ insists that the environmental 
concerns should be solved before granting an approval for the project. State 19 indicates that 
President Obama rejects the project under pressure from the NDEQ, and Canada stops insisting 
on the agreement. Therefore, Asia becomes Canada’s main customer (O’Rourke, 2013). In state 
21, however, the US directly accepts the proposal and becomes Canada’s main customer. 
However, there is the possibility of requesting some minor modifications while accepting the 
project, which could lead to appeasing the NDEQ and other moderate environmentalists.  
 
              
               States 
                       
      Solution 
     Concepts 
12  19  21 
Nash Equilibrium   
 
 
 
GMR 
 
 
 
 
 
SMR 
 
 
 
 
 
SEQ 
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State 12 is considered an acceptable result and relatively strong equilibrium because it 
satisfies the rules of all solution concepts except Nash stability (sequential choice). According to 
state 12, if President Obama requests modification from TransCanada, the mission of the NDEQ 
is done, and, pressure from the NDEQ would be eliminated. Therefore, the transition from status 
quo, state 24, to state 12 would occur. However, Republicans still push the opposition party 
(Democratic Party) to accept the project as soon as possible. In this situation, Canada will agree 
to apply the new modifications and will seek alternative routes. 
According to Figure 3.1, if the US is in state 12, the US can unilaterally improve its position 
by moving to state 11, in response to which the Canadian Coalition would improve to state 9, 
which the Republicans do not tend to move away from to another state. However, the NDEQ 
prefers to improve from 9 to 21, which is less preferred by President Obama than 12. Therefore, 
President Obama is not in favor of moving from state 12, since he might eventually end up in 
state 21. Hence, state 12 is sequentially sanctioned for President Obama by other DMs.  
3.6. Status Quo Analysis 
    The status quo, state 24 in Table 3.10, represents the current real-world situation. Other 
feasible states show likelihoods of DMs’ movements from the status quo. Table 3.10 shows 
transition of DMs from status quo to state 21 which is one of the equilibrium states. Note that Y 
means yes and indicates the situation in which the DM has chosen the Option. As described in 
Table 3.10 , if the President improves from status quo, state 24, to state 23, the Canadian 
Coalition progresses to state 21, which is an equilibrium state for all DMs. In the Keystone XL 
case, state 23 is considered as an intermediary state.  
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Table 3.10: State Transition to State 21, an Equilibrium State 
DM Option Status Quo 
intermediary 
State 
Possible  
Equilibrium 
State 
President 
Obama 
1 N Y Y 
2 Y N N 
Canada 
3 N N Y 
4 Y Y N 
Republicans 5 Y Y Y 
NDEQ 6 Y Y Y 
State Number - 24 23 21 
 
 
Table 3.11 shows each DM’s point of view regarding the project when they are in state 21. 
Firstly, Republicans are in competition with the Democratic Party and even if the project is 
approved, they would have objections because of delays in the process of approving the project. 
Also in NDEQ’s point of view, they prefer that the project is stopped or that the environmental 
impacts are reduced significantly. Therefore in this equilibrium state, they would not be satisfied 
with the results. 
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Table 3.11: Description of DMs’ Points of View in State 21 
DMs Description of DMs’ Points of View 
President Obama 
Approves the proposal, while requesting minor 
modifications to show his consideration for 
environmentalists. 
Canadian Coalition 
Starts building the Keystone XL pipeline 
proposed by TransCanada in April, 2012, 
while using other customers (e.g., China) as 
leverage for economic bargaining with the US. 
Republicans 
Tries to find ways to show that the decision of 
Democrats is solely a political game (wasted 
time by initially rejecting the project to help 
Obama win the 2012 election), and thus, 
continue pressuring the President. 
NDEQ 
Not satisfied with the result; therefore, keep 
pressuring. 
 
Table 3.12 shows the transition of DMs from the status quo to state 19. If the President makes 
a transition from status quo, state 24, to state 22, the Canadian Coalition could progress to state 
19, which is an equilibrium state for all DMs. In the Keystone XL case, state 22 is considered an 
intermediary state. Table 3.13 briefly describes DMs’ points of view in state 19. If President 
Obama rejects the proposal proposed by TransCanada in May 2012, Canadian Coalition would 
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prefer to cancel the project. In this situation, unlike NDEQ, the Republicans would not be 
satisfied with the results and continue their pressuring.   
Table 3.12: State Transition to State 19, an Equilibrium State 
DM Option Status Quo 
intermediary 
State 
Possible  
Equilibrium 
State 
President 
Obama 
1 N N N 
2 Y N N 
Canada 
3 N N N 
4 Y Y N 
Republicans 5 Y Y Y 
NDEQ 6 Y Y Y 
State Number - 24 22 19 
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Table 3.13: Description of DMs’ Points of View in State 19 
DMs Description of DMs’ Points of View 
President Obama 
Rejects the proposal due to pressure from 
NDEQ.  
Canadian Coalition 
Cancels the Project and refuses to insist. There 
is even a likelihood that it decides to diversify 
its crude oil to Asia. 
Republicans 
As supporters of the project, they are not 
satisfied with the results and therefore their 
pressuring would continue. 
NDEQ 
Are satisfied with the results, since their 
pressuring had an influential role on President 
Obama to reject the project. 
 
Due to many factors, such as economic benefits, meeting national interests (Gasser, 2012; 
O’Rourke, 2013), and allowing less dependency on the Middle East for importing oil, the 
likelihood of President Obama approving the project is high and the occurrence of state 21 is 
higher compared to state 19. Moreover, if President Obama requests modification, Canadian 
Coalition may refuse to modify the project for applying again. This further complicates the 
situation for President Obama since it is not preferable for him to be denied by Canadian 
Coalition. Hence, the likelihood of President Obama requesting modification is low. Therefore as 
the results of the current study show, President Obama either approves or rejects the proposal. 
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3.7. Sensitivity Analysis  
To examine the robustness of the proposed graph model shown in Table 3.14, the order of each 
DM’s preference in Table 3.4 is changed subjectively, and a new stability analysis was executed. 
Table 3.15 shows individual stability and equilibrium results for the states in the conflict based 
on the new ordinal ranking of DMs’ preferences. A line above some states, such as states 9 and 
11 for President Obama, indicates the DM is indifferent between these states. In the original 
scenario, state 9 was the more preferred state for President Obama. The equilibrium states 
resulting from sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table 3.15.  
As shown in Table 3.15, states 7, 9, 13, 18, and 19 are strong equilibria, and state 12 is again a 
relatively acceptable one. In comparison to the equilibria gained in the main scenario (Table 3.9) 
and the second scenario (Table 3.15), states 19 and 12 result as stable states for all DMs and 
appear in both scenarios. Therefore, the initial model proposed seems to be fairly robust and 
reliable. In addition, states 7, 9, 13 and 18 are new equilibria that are gained by changing DMs’      
preferences. These new resolutions can be interpreted within the context of the preference 
changes. 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Table 3.14: Stability Analysis Tableau Form (Second Scenario) 
President Obama 
Overall 
stability 
X X X X X X X X E E X X X X X E X X X X X X X X 
Player 
stability 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Preference 
vector 
3 5 6 18 12 24 17 15 11 9 21 23 19 13 16 7 10 22 4 1 2 8 20 14 
UIs 
  5    18  12      18  12 24 5  1 7 19 13 
              17  11 23 6      
Canadian Coalition 
Player 
stability 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Preference 
vector 
3 9 21 15 17 23 11 5 6 12 24 18 2 8 20 1 7 14 19 13 10 4 22 16 
UIs     15 21 9 3     6 12 24   18   7 1 19 13 
Republicans 
Player 
stability 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Preference 
vector 
11 9 23 21 17 15 3 5 6 12 18 24 1 13 16 4 7 19 10 22 2 8 20 14 
UIs     23 21 9 11  6  18             
NDEQ 
Player 
stability 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Preference 
vector 
13 16 14 18 6 24 12 19 22 20 7 10 1 4 8 2 3 5 11 9 17 15 23 21 
UIs     18        13 16  14     5 3 11 9 
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Table 3.15: Equilibrium Results for the Second Scenario 
 
State 18 reflects that pressures from the NDEQ cause President Obama to request 
modification, either directly or indirectly, and the Canadian Coalition would accept the 
modification. However, the Republicans prefer to remain silent. The point is that, in this real 
conflict, since the President is a member of the Democrat Party, Republicans will always try to 
find ways to put pressure on him either by using the Keystone XL project or other issues. Thus, 
the assumption of the existence of pressure from the Republicans is a good approximation of 
reality. The possibility that Republicans will not continue to pressure the President to accept the 
project could exist if we consider lobbying power among politicians. 
 
             States 
    Solution 
    Concepts 
7 9 12 13 18 19 21 
Nash Equilibrium 
  
 
    
GMR 
       
SMR 
       
SEQ 
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States 7 and 13 both represent rejection of the project by the President. In this situation, 
Canada abandons the US and deals with Asia instead. This issue may be influenced by the 
pressure applied by the NDEQ if we assume that state 13 happens. In state 7, though, because of 
the sense of competition with the Democratic Party and dissatisfaction with the results, the 
Republicans continue to pressure President Obama if he rejects the project. Also, state 9 
represents that, although the President accepts the project, Republicans, as a competitor, try to 
find ways to apply pressure on him in another context, such as stating that the delay in making 
the decision to approve the project wasted valuable time.  
Table 3.16 shows a tableau form for a third scenario of the Keystone XL pipeline conflict. 
The order of preferences or options has not changed. The only difference in Table 3.16 compared 
to Table 3.7 is that DMs’ irreversible moves have been considered in this table.  Irreversible 
moves refer to situations where a particular DM cannot move back to the original state. 
In the standard or main scenario, to improve the flexibility of the decision-making system, 
irreversible moves were not considered. However, to examine the robustness of the proposed 
model, two situations were considered as irreversible for the main DMs. First, the researcher 
assumed that if President Obama rejects the project, he cannot change his mind under any 
conditions (e.g., even if TransCanada insists on working with its important customer, the US, by 
proposing an alternative route). Second, in the case that Canada denies modification, the project 
would be canceled completely and, thus, Asia would become the main customer for Canada’s oil 
sands.  
According to Table 3.16 and our assumptions in the third scenario, improvement of President 
Obama from state 4 to states 5 and 6 is impossible. His UIs from states 10 to 11 and 12, 16 to 17 
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and 18, and 22 to 23 and 24 are also assumed to be impossible. Moreover, states 2, 8, 14, and 20 
are irreversible for the Canadian Coalition. For example, in state 2, President Obama requests 
modification, but the Canadian Coalition does not agree to the modification.  In this situation, 
and if irreversible moves are considered, the Canadian Coalition cannot make an improvement 
from state 2 to state 6. 
Moreover, based on individual stability analysis for the third scenario, after considering 
irreversible moves, some states that were unstable(i.e., states 4, 10, 16, and 22 for President 
Obama and states 2, 8, 14, and 20 for the Canadian Coalition) turn into Nash equilibria states. 
These states were all unstable in the original scenario. Moreover, some states, such as states 4 
and 10, were sanctioned by the main DMs for NDEQ in Table 3.7.  However, in the third 
scenario after irreversible moves have been considered, the main DMs are banned from 
improving from some states. This is why states such as 4 and 10 become unstable for NDEQ and 
NDEQ has no worries about being sanctioned by the main DMs. 
After identifying the irreversible moves, individual and overall stability analyses are 
conducted using standard solution concepts. States 19 and 21 are overall the most reliable 
equilibria states and state 12 is a relatively robust state. In sum, the analyses revealed that in the 
proposed model regarding the Keystone XL project, regardless of whether the analyst considers 
some moves as irreversible or not, the final equilibrium results are the same. Consequently, for 
the Keystone XL pipeline case study, the existence of restrictions for some states created by 
irreversible moves had no effect on the overall equilibrium results. 
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Table 3.16: Stability Analysis Tableau Form for the Keystone XL Pipeline (Third Scenario) 
President Obama 
Overall 
stability 
X X X X X X X X E E X X X X X E X X X X X X X X 
Player 
stability 
R R S R R S R R S R R U R R R R R R R R U U U U 
Preference 
vector 
3 5 6 15 17 18 9 11 12 21 23 24 1 13 7 19 4 10 16 22 2 8 14 20 
UIs 
  5   17   11   23     5 11 17 23 1 7 13 19 
                6 12 18 24     
Canadian Coalition 
Player 
stability 
R R R R U U U U R R R R R R R R R R R R U U U U 
Preference 
vector 
3 9 21 15 5 11 23 17 6 12 24 18 8 2 20 14 7 1 19 13 10 4 22 16 
UIs     3 9 21 15     12 6 24 18     7 1 19 13 
Republicans 
Player 
stability 
R R U U R R U U R R U U R S R U R R U U R R U U 
Preference 
vector 
9 21 3 15 11 23 5 17 12 24 6 18 7 1 19 13 10 22 4 16 8 20 2 14 
UIs   9 21   11 23   12 24  7  19   10 22   8 20 
NDEQ 
Player 
stability 
R R R R R R U U U U U U R R S S R R R R U U U U 
Preference 
vector 
13 16 14 19 22 20 7 10 1 4 8 2 18 24 6 12 17 15 23 21 5 11 3 9 
UIs       19 22 13 16 20 14   18 24     17 23 15 21 
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3.8. Summary of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution Implementation    
   In addition to discussing the solution concepts’ definitions, Figure 3.2 introduces a brief 
description of the graph model procedures and how the Keystone pipeline conflict case study fits 
in this process. In the first step, the information required for understanding the real-world 
conflict has been gathered and categorized under three dimensions: environment-safety-health, 
politics, and economics. In the next step, the graph model technique is used to model and analyze 
the conflict. This step is further followed by discussing the insights of the Keystone XL conflict 
(in Chapter 5), which could assist DMs in their day-to-day practical experiences. The graph 
model for conflict resolution technique is also useful for researchers in fields such as policy 
making, social science, engineering, and environmental management. 
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Figure 3.2: Outline of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
(Fang et al., 1993, p. 18) 
Identify DMs and their possible options 
Remove infeasible states, find the DMs’ transitions through feasible states, clarify DMs’ preferences, 
and rank DMs’ preferences 
 
Real-World Strategic Conflict (The Keystone XL Pipeline Project) 
 
2- Stability Analysis   
 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution technique: 1- Construct the Model Based on Real World 
Strategic Conflict 
 
Discussing insights and applications of the results  
 
Structuring a framework using key realms, namely environment/social, economic, and 
political, which underlie the strategic conflict between the US and Canada regarding the 
Keystone XL pipeline project 
 
In analyzing the data, certain rules called solution concepts must be followed. Using solution 
concepts is critical to identifying individuals’ stable states. It also assists us in investigating the 
states which are stable for all DMs (Equilibrium states). 
Solution Concepts are:  
Nash (Rationality): “A focal DM cannot unilaterally move to a more preferred state.” 
General metarationality (GMR): “All of the focal DM’s unilateral improvements are 
sanctioned by subsequent unilateral moves by others” 
Symmetric metarationality (SMR): “All of the focal DM’s unilateral improvements are still 
sanctioned even after a possible response by this DM” 
Sequential stability (SEQ): “All of the focal DM’s unilateral improvements are sanctioned by  
subsequent unilateral improvements by others” (Obeidi et al., 2005).  
Further on, for examining the robustness of the model, sensitivity analysis should be 
conducted. 
 
Insights and Applications 
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Chapter Four: Perceptual Graph Model of the Keystone XL Project 
Standard graph model analysis is a useful technique to understand complex conflicts and their 
DMs’ options and strategies. Through this technique, equilibria states are systematically 
recognized, shedding light onto possible conflict solutions. However, this technique does not 
explicitly consider DMs’ interactions and their perceptions towards each other. Perceptual graph 
model technique has been introduced to the literature to fill this gap. This technique incorporates 
DMs’ emotions into the decision analysis (Obeidi, et al., 2005) and thus, assists researchers in 
recognizing and modeling DMs’ unique perspectives towards the conflict. The definitions of the 
concepts related to the perceptual graph model technique have been introduced in Appendix B.  
    Emotions have the power to change feasible states into infeasible states, consequently 
eliminating them from the analysis. Some negative emotions may mask the DMs’ options and 
their number of recognized states (Obeidi et al., 2005). For example, in the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, the existing anger and prejudice among the involved DMs eliminates the possibility of 
peaceful negotiations and communication, promoting war and aggressive attitudes. 
    Perceptual graph models allow modeling the way individuals conceptualize conflict 
independently with their own perception and awareness regarding other DMs and their 
perception of the conflict. Perceptual graph model develops unique stability analyses for each of 
these DMs, and also combines all these inconsistent perspectives into one single analysis. The 
individual and overall stability analyses conducted with the perceptual graph model technique 
provides broad and in-depth insight into the conflict. From this exhaustive perspective private 
and overall stable states are determined and consolidated. Overall, the states identified as stable 
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under more solution concepts and perspectives are more robust since they represent a broader 
range of stability in different situations and from different viewpoints.  
In the case of the Keystone XL pipeline project, economic and power competition between the 
US and Asia, could push President Obama toward approving the project and ignoring 
environmental concerns. Emotional factors (e.g., fear that Canada could open its oil markets to 
rivals) could affect Obama administration’s decision-making process. 
At the G8 summit held in Russia in 2006, the prime minister of Canada declared that Canada 
is “an emerging energy superpower.” This issue has led Canada to expand its energy-producing 
power by facilitating a variety of projects. Because of the employment opportunities and 
anticipated financial profits associated with the Keystone XL project, the Canadian Coalition has 
eagerly tried to convince the US to approve the project. The prime minister of Canada can 
enhance Canada’s financial position through the Keystone XL project. The aim is to understand 
how Canadian Coalition’s perspective can affect its decisions regarding the project after the US 
presidential response. The Canadian Coalition could either insist on constructing the project by 
proposing an alternative route or refuse to modify the most recently submitted proposal. In 
another scenario, the Canadian Coalition could cancel the project completely and deal only in the 
Asian market or it could accept modification but send a considerable portion of its crude oil to 
Asia. 
Congressional Republicans have emphasized the positive aspects of the project to pressure the 
President to accept it. The presidential election and political dynamics in the US highlighted the 
role of Republicans regarding the project’s destiny. The Keystone XL pipeline turned into an 
opportunity for them to oppose the Democratic Party. They criticized President Obama for 
61 
 
rejecting the project and, thus, delaying construction of the pipeline. Republicans claimed that 
this decision was political, meant to buy time for the Democratic Party before the November 
2012 presidential election.  
On the other hand, NDEQ’s decisions and positions have also been directed by a deep sense 
of feeling and caring for the environment. All in all, the role of emotions will be further studied 
to assess the Keystone XL strategic conflict model to understand how emotion and inconsistent 
perceptions affect the visibility of states in DMs’ perspectives.  
The perceptual graph model technique’s assumption is that negative emotions are present 
among the DMs to the extent that they do not perceive some feasible states. In other words, 
because of their emotions toward other DMs or some aspects of the conflict, some states are 
hidden in their perspectives. However, as mentioned earlier, the Keystone XL pipeline conflict is 
a friendly dispute and not a serious conflict. Although the DMs in this conflict have negative 
emotions and disagreements with each other, they are trying to find resolutions. Therefore, since 
intense emotions do not exist among DMs to explore application of the perceptual graph model 
in the current conflict, it is assumed that some of the least preferred states for some DMs are 
hidden states  
In sum, after recognized and hidden states have been identified for each of the DMs, 
perceptual stability analysis is conducted to determine equilibria states. According to Figure 4.1, 
perceptual stability analysis consists of two parts. First, individual stability analysis is 
implemented for each of the DMs when they are aware of other DMs’ hidden states and also for 
when they are not. After identification of individual and overall stable states for each DM in 
different awareness statuses, meta-stability analysis in section 4.7 is conducted. In this second 
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phase, the results of the first phase are consolidated and equilibrium states are identified using 
specific equilibrium forms and rules. The method applied in this chapter has been drawn solely 
from two journal papers authored by Amer Obeidi, Keith Hipel, and Mark Kilgour (Obeidi et al., 
2005; Obeidi, et al., 2009). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Perceptual Stability Analysis 
 
4.1. Model Construction 
Before perceptual analysis, it is necessary to construct a model. Modeling the conflict in a 
perceptual graph model analysis is similar to structuring a model in a standard graph model 
technique, explained in Chapter 3. With the aim of testing the robustness of the previously 
analyzed standard graph model in Chapter 3 and also showcasing the dynamic and flexible 
nature of the graph model technique, the Canadian Coalition’s options have been slightly altered 
in this recent model. In the newly constructed model summarized in Table 4.1, the Canadian 
Coalition has two options: first, it can deny modification (deny) and second, it can diversify the 
bitumen gained from oil sands to Asian markets (diversify). In the model used in this section, 
President Obama and the Canadian Coalition are still the main or critical DMs, while 
Republicans and NDEQ are the influential DMs. Overall, DMs’ options have not changed except 
for the Canadian Coalition. In section 4.2, the new model proposed in section 4.1 is analyzed 
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using standard graph analysis. Then in section 4.4, the new model is studied using perceptual 
graph models of each DM. 
Table 4.1: The DMs and Their Options 
DMs Options 
President Obama  
1- Approve the Keystone XL pipeline project (Approve)  
2- Request major modifications from the Canadian Coalition (Major 
Modification)  
Note: If President Obama does not choose Options 1 and 2, he is rejecting 
the project  
Canadian Coalition  
3- Deny modification requested by President Obama (Deny)  
4- Diversify the bitumen extracted from oil sands to Asian markets 
(Diversify) 
Note: If the Canadian Coalition does not choose Options 3 and 4, either the 
US has approved the project or Canada intends to convince the US regarding 
proceeding with construction of the project 
Republicans  5- Pressure the president to approve the project (Pressure)  
NDEQ  
6- Pressure to stop the project; otherwise, reduce and even eliminate all 
environmental impacts (Pressure to Solve or Stop)  
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4.1.2. The Set of Feasible and Infeasible States 
The identification of states plays a significant role in predicting possible scenarios for the future; 
in the current model, the six options representing the DMs’ possible actions produce 26 states. A 
brief explanation of these options is provided in Table 4.1. In the next step, infeasible states 
should be removed from the model.  
    Table 4.2 is the “option form” for our model and contains information regarding the options of 
DMs, each DM’s strategy, and all the developed states, each represented by a number in the last 
row of the table. In the table, “Y” (i.e., yes) means that a DM selected the option, and likewise 
“N” (i.e., no) reflects that the DM has not chosen the option.  
States that are deemed to be unreasonable or unlikely to occur have been systematically 
eliminated from the model. As stated in Chapter 3, mutually exclusive options refer to 
combinations of options that are logically infeasible outcomes. In this model, the possibility of 
the simultaneous occurrence of options 1 and 2, 1 and 4, or 1 and 3 is deemed to be impossible 
(Appendix B). The first combination (i.e., simultaneous occurrence of options 1 and 2) indicates 
that President Obama would not approve the proposal, but would request major modification. 
The second and third combinations (i.e., occurrence of options 1 and 4) are also logically 
infeasible because if President Obama approves the Keystone XL project, the Canadian Coalition 
would not deny the project or send a major portion of bitumen to Asia; rather, it would construct 
the pipeline as TransCanada proposed in May 2012. 
Another method for ruling out infeasible states is to directly specify the infeasible 
combinations. For example, in the model proposed here, if the Canadian Coalition selects option 
4, option 3 has also been selected. This means that if the Canadian Coalition has decided to 
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diversify to Asian markets, it must have denied the project and, thus, option 3 has to be chosen. 
Using these systematic elimination methods, 28 feasible states remain and are listed in Table 4.2. 
As described in Chapter 3, some of the feasible states have the potential to be intermediary 
states for a specific DM. For instance, in the option form provided in this chapter, state 6 is 
intermediary for Republicans because right after President Obama rejects the project, 
Republicans would increase their pressure on the president, unilaterally moving to state 13 from 
state 6.  
State 7 could also be an intermediary state for the Republicans. One scenario is that after the 
US has requested modification, because of negotiations and lobbying, Republicans are convinced 
not to pressure President Obama to approve the project. However, in reality, Republicans have 
the opportunity to improve to state 14, which makes state 7 an intermediary state. 
State 24 is the status quo and represents the current situation regarding this ongoing conflict. 
President Obama rejected the project in January 2012, declaring that his decision was due to 
pressure from Republicans, who assigned a deadline for making a decision regarding the project 
before the presidential election in November 2012. On the other hand, most environmentalists 
and NDEQ believe that the Keystone XL project would have serious environmental impacts, 
especially for areas in and surrounding Nebraska. Emphasizing the potential economic profit of 
the project for the US, President Obama complained that Republicans did not allow the DOS to 
comprehensively explore the project’s environmental impacts and to help TransCanada find 
alternative routes to prevent possible negative effects. Through these statements, he indirectly 
requested modification from the Canadian Coalition. Further on, TransCanada resubmitted an 
alternative route to receive a presidential permit for the revised proposal. Although the Canadian 
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Coalition has threatened to diversify its oil sands bitumen to China if President Obama rejects 
the project, it has not yet made any serious attempts to execute this option. 
67 
 
Table 4.2: Option Form 
President Obama 
Approve N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N 
Request 
modification 
N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y 
Canadian Coalition 
Deny 
Modification 
N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y 
Diversify N N N N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y 
Republicans 
Pressure to 
approve 
N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
NDEQ 
Pressure to 
solve or stop 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
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4.1.3. DMs’ Preferences 
After identifying DMs and their options, feasible states are ordinally ranked from the most to the 
least preferred (from left to right) for each DM, as illustrated in Table 4.3. Equally preferred 
states are indicated by a line drawn on top of the numbers. Rankings of the states are based on 
DMs’ preferences and are determined through a subjective process of studying and assessing the 
conflict’s various aspects. Preference identification is a necessary step to achieve a more accurate 
analysis of the strategic conflict. 
    President Obama’s priority is approving the operation of the pipeline (i.e., choosing option 1); 
therefore, states 2, 16, 9, and 23 are the scenarios that are most preferred by the US president. 
State 3 has been identified as a second priority for President Obama because it refers to the 
situation where he has requested modification, while the Canadian Coalition has not denied this 
request and there is no pressure from influential DMs. Least preferred states for President Obama 
occur when the Canadian Coalition denies modification and also diversifies bitumen to Asia.  
  As described earlier, the Canadian Coalition’s priority is for the project to gain approval from 
President Obama. However, if Canada receives a modification request, it could have a chance to 
lobby the US to proceed toward approving the project. Pressure from the NDEQ is not favorable 
for Canada because the Canadian Coalition believes that construction of the pipeline is a 
reasonable way to reduce GHG emissions compared to transporting oil sands bitumen by truck. 
Several problems, such as leakage in some sections of the pipeline and the energy needed to heat 
huge amounts of water, have created serious concerns about approval of the Keystone XL project 
(Cryderman, 2013). This has led NDEQ to oppose approval despite the other three DMs’ 
69 
 
preferences. If President Obama rejects the project and the Canadian Coalition decides to deny 
modification, it is preferable for Canada to diversify its oil sands bitumen rather than do nothing.    
  In contrast, Republicans strongly support approval of the project. One of their stated priorities 
in the 2012 presidential election was proceeding with construction of the pipeline. Republicans’ 
viewpoint regarding economic development and less dependency on Middle Eastern countries 
for importing energy is consistent with President Obama’s opinion. This is why the ranking of 
Republicans’ preferences is somewhat similar to President Obama’s preference alignment. For 
example, both Democrats’ and Republicans’ least preferred states are 7, 14, 21, and 28. 
However, in some situations, the order of state ranking differs for each party. For example, 
Republicans favor pressuring President Obama, while this issue is not preferred from his 
perspective. 
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Table 4.3: Ranking the Preferences of DMs from the Most (Left) to Least (Right) 
DMs Ranking of States 
President 
Obama 
2 3 16 9 23 17 10 24 1 15 8 22 4 18 11 25 6 20 13 27 5 19 12 26 7 21 14 28 
Canadian 
Coalition 
2 9 23 16 10 3 24 17 14 7 28 21 12 5 19 26 13 6 27 20 8       1      11      4 22     15      25   18 
Republicans 9 23 2 16 10 24 3 17 8 22 1 15 11 25 4 18 13 27 6 20 12 26 5 19 14 28 7 21 
NDEQ 15 18 20 22 25 27 1 8 4 6 11 13 21 19 28 26 12 5 7 14 17 24 3 10 16 23 2 9 
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4.2. Representing the Strategic Conflict Using Standard Graph Form for the New Model  
Figure 4.2 shows the integrated graph model for the Keystone XL strategic conflict in the new 
model proposed in this chapter. Republicans, represented as DM3, could improve from state 6 to 
state 13. NDEQ, indicated by DM4, could have a UI from state 6 to state 20. President Obama 
and the Canadian Coalition could also unilaterally move from state 6. All in all, DMs only 
control their own option changes leading to transitions from one state to another. For example, in 
the transition between state 6 and state 7, only President Obama has changed his strategy, while 
other DMs’ strategies have not been altered. 
4.3. Stability Analysis of the Keystone XL Strategic Conflict Based on the Graph Model 
In this part, since the model has changed compared to the constructed model in Chapter 3, a 
standard stability analysis has been conducted by means of comparison with the perceptual graph 
model. Table 4.4 is the tableau form of the graph model and contains individual preferences from 
the most to the least (left to right) preferred, their UIs, and individual stability for all DMs. Also, 
overall stability, indicated at the top of Table 4.4, shows states that are stable for all DMs (i.e., 
equilibrium states).  
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Figure 4.2: Integrated Graph Form; 
DM1: President Obama, DM2: Canadian Coalition, DM3: Republicans, DM4: NDEQ. Note: The relations between the arcs are all bidirectional. 
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Table 4.4: Stability Analysis tableau form for the Keystone XL Pipeline Strategic Conflict 
President Obama 
Overall 
stability 
X X X X E X X X X X X X X X X X X X X E X X X X X X X X 
Player 
stability 
R S R R R U U U U U U U R R R R R R R R U U U U U U U U 
Preference 
vector 
2 3 16 9 23 17 10 24 1 15 8 22 4 18 11 25 6 20 13 27 5 19 12 26 7 21 14 28 
UIs 
 2    16 9 23 2 16 9 23         4 18 11 25 6 20 13 27 
        3 17 10 24                 
Canadian Coalition 
Player 
stability 
R R R R R R R R U U U U S S S S R R R R U U U U U U U U 
Preference 
vector 
2 9 23 16 10 3 24 17 14 7 28 21 12 5 19 26 13 6 27 20 8 1 11 4 22 15 25 18 
UIs 
        10 3 24 17 10 3 17 24     13 6 13 6 27 20 27 20 
            14 7 21 28             
Republicans 
Player 
stability 
R R U U R R U U R R U U R R S S R R U U R R U U R R U U 
Preference 
vector 
9 23 2 16 10 24 3 17 8 22 1 15 11 25 4 18 13 27 6 20 12 26 5 9 14 28 7 21 
UIs   9 23   10 24   8 22   11 25   13 27   12 26   14 28 
NDEQ 
Player 
stability 
R R R R R R S S U U U U R R R R U U U U R R S S R R U U 
Preference 
vector 
15 18 20 22 25 27 1 8 4 6 11 13 21 19 28 26 12 5 7 14 17 24 3 10 16 23 2 9 
UIs       15 22 18 20 25 27     26 19 21 28   17 24   16 23 
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GMCRII, a decision support system, was used to conduct stability analysis to determine stable 
and unstable states based on a set of solution concepts, which are explained in Table 3.6, Chapter 
3 (Appendix B). According to Table 4.4, state 2 is the most preferred state for President Obama 
and the Canadian Coalition. Thus, state 2 is rational (i.e., “R”) and satisfies Nash stability for 
both DMs. State 1 is unstable (i.e., “U”) for President Obama since he may choose to move to 
other states such as state 2 or state 3, which he prefers to state 1. State 4 is sanctioned (i.e., “S”) 
for Republicans by other DMs. This means that if Republicans improve to state 11 from state 4, 
NDEQ would improve to state 25 and the Canadian Coalition would unilaterally move to state 
27, which is Nash stable for President Obama. However, state 27 is less preferred than state 4 for 
Republicans. This means that, despite the initial intention of Republicans to improve from state 4 
to a better state, the consequence of the mentioned unilateral improvement may not be in 
Republicans’ favor since it gives other DMs the opportunity to unilaterally improve to stable 
states that are less preferred for Republicans than state 4.  
    Based on solution concepts’ definitions, as indicated in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, states 23 and 
27 are stable for all DMs (i.e., equilibrium states). The mentioned states satisfy all rules or 
solution concepts and are represented by “E.” The states that are stable for some but not all DMs 
are shown by “X” in Table 4.4 (Appendix B). 
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Table 4.5: Equilibria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Both equilibrium states represent enforcement from influential DMs. Republicans try to push 
President Obama to move toward approval of the Keystone XL pipeline, while NDEQ insists 
that the environmental concerns should be resolved before granting approval for the project. 
State 27 indicates that President Obama rejects the project under pressure from NDEQ. In this 
state, the Canadian Coalition would not insist on continuing the project and, thus, would deny 
modification and diversify large amounts of its oil sands bitumen to Asia. However, state 23 
represents the situation in which President Obama directly approves the proposal and becomes 
Canada’s main customer. However, even in this condition, requesting some minor modifications 
is still probable. President Obama requesting minor modifications from the Canadian Coalition 
may appease NDEQ and other moderate environmentalists to some extent.  
 
        States 
                       
Solution 
 Concepts  23  27 
Nash Equilibrium  
 
 
 
GMR  
 
 
 
SMR  
 
 
 
SEQ  
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Interestingly, the resulting equilibrium states in this chapter are similar to the results of the 
primary model proposed in Chapter 3. This issue demonstrates the relatively high robustness of 
the developed models in this study. As shown in Table 4.6, state 27 in the current model is 
similar to state 19 in the previous model from Chapter 3. In state 27, the Canadian Coalition will 
stop insisting on the project’s approval and diversify the main portion of bitumen to Asia. On the 
other hand, state 19 in the previous model shows Canada’s intention to diversify oil sands 
bitumen when the project is rejected by President Obama. State 21 in the original model and 
state 23 in the current model are also similar. Both indicate that President Obama will approve 
the project. In the former model, the Canadian Coalition chooses option 3 (i.e., build the 
pipeline). The latter model indicates that after the project has been approved, the Canadian 
Coalition would not diversify high amounts of oil sands bitumen to Asia. Also, not denying 
modification after the project has been approved by President Obama means that the Canadian 
Coalition is consenting to the construction of TransCanada’s proposed route from May 2012.  
Table 4.6: Comparison of the Equilibria States in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
Model Proposed in This Chapter Model Proposed in Chapter 3 
State Numbers 23 27  19 21 
President Obama President Obama 
1- Approve Y N 1- Approve N Y 
2- Request 
Modification 
N N 
2- Request 
Modification 
N N 
Canadian Coalition Canadian Coalition 
3- Deny 
Modification 
N Y 3- Build N Y 
4- Diversify N Y 4- Modify N N 
Republicans Republicans   
5- Pressure to 
Approve 
Y Y 
5- Pressure to 
Approve 
Y Y 
NDEQ NDEQ 
6- Pressure to 
Solve or Stop 
Y Y 
6- Pressure to 
Solve or Stop 
Y Y 
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4.4. Perceptual Graph Model for the Keystone XL Pipeline Conflict 
In the standard graph model technique section outlined above, the conflict was modeled and 
analyzed. The methodology was exactly the same as the technique used in Chapter 3. Modeling 
of the perceptual graph model technique is also similar to this process. Determining DMs, their 
options, feasible states, and state rankings based on DMs’ preferences are primary steps in the 
perceptual graph model technique. In the first step of perceptual stability analysis, hidden states 
for each of the DMs are identified. Then, based on each DM’s awareness of whether other DMs 
can or cannot see all the states in its own graph model and with the help of particular perceptual 
solution concepts, individual and overall stable states are determined. 
4.4.1. Hidden and Recognized States 
Due to existing negative emotions such as fear and anger, a DM would not consider or be aware 
of certain states. These states are invisible in this DM’s point of view and are called hidden 
states. The criticality of recognizing and studying a conflict’s hidden states becomes evident in 
the case of serious tensions between two or more parties. Although there are no highly elevated 
negative emotions among the DMs in the conflict over the Keystone XL project, the perceptual 
graph model can be used to analyze this friendly dispute with different, though interesting, 
perspectives. For this purpose, the least preferred states for each DM are assumed to be hidden in 
that particular DM’s point of view. The aim is to apply the perceptual graph technique to analyze 
each DM’s perceptual graph based on his or her own awareness regarding others’ strategies.  
    The remaining set of states that DMs perceive are known as recognized states. Table 4.7 lists 
hidden states in each DM’s point of view. For example, states 7, 14, 21, and 28 are assumed to 
be hidden in President Obama’s perspective. They represent the situation where President 
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Obama requests modification but the Canadian Coalition denies it and diverts the main portion of 
Canada’s bitumen to Asia. These states are least preferred for President Obama since they reflect 
the image of an incapable president of a powerful country. Before requesting modification, 
President Obama prefers to negotiate with the Canadian Coalition to convince its members that 
the proposed route has environmental problems that must be resolved. Moreover, he tries to 
prevent the Canadian Coalition from selling its oil sands bitumen to Asian markets. Since 
shipping oil sands bitumen to Asia is not at all a favorable outcome for the US, President Obama 
would try to avoid these states at all cost, making them hidden in his perspective. Consequently, 
all the mentioned feasible states are recognized by President Obama except states 7, 14, 21, and 
28. 
    Although Republicans are concerned about the pride of their country and the above mentioned 
states (i.e., states 7, 14, 21, and 28) are least preferred in their eyes as well, they are in serious 
political competition with the Democratic Party. Therefore, these states have not been considered 
as hidden for Republicans since their concern is lower than President Obama’s wariness 
regarding the situation where states 7, 14, 21, and 28 are attained. For the reason outlined above, 
Republicans perceive all feasible states of the proposed model and have no hidden states in their 
perspective. 
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Table 4.7: Hidden or Least preferred States for Each DM’s Point of View 
DMs Hidden States 
President Obama 7, 14, 21, 28 
Canadian Coalition 15, 18, 22, 25 
Republicans - 
NDEQ 2,9 
 
States 15, 18, 22, and 25 represent the situation in which President Obama rejects the project 
but the Canadian Coalition does not diversify its oil to Asia. In states 15 and 22, Canada does not 
deny modification, but in states 18 and 25 it does. These are hidden states for Canada since they 
convey a worldwide image of Canada as incapable. The US has requested modifications many 
times and once even rejected the proposal. Canada, on the other hand, has always been patient in 
submitting revised proposals. However, it has not shown signs of patience in statements 
regarding the probability of President Obama rejecting the most recent proposal. If the US rejects 
the proposal, Canada would most probably diversify its oil to Asian markets to show the US and 
the world that Canada is not solely dependent on the US.  For the above reasons, Canada does 
not perceive that these four states (i.e., US rejects the proposal and Canada does not diversify its 
oil to Asian markets) can occur in the real world, making them hidden states in the eyes of this 
DM. 
    As shown in Table 4.7, states 2 and 9 are assumed to be hidden states in NDEQ’s point of 
view. Both states represent the condition where despite President Obama’s approval of the 
Keystone XL project, NDEQ is not pressuring him to stop the project or resolve its 
environmental impacts. Thus, NDEQ does not perceive the mentioned states as possible to occur. 
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NDEQ fears that the project will severely endanger the environment. Therefore, if it does not 
pressure President Obama, it will be put in the spotlight for not acting against this tragedy. 
Because of this fear, the two mentioned states do not have the chance to occur and are hidden in 
the view of NDEQ. 
4.5. Perceptual Graph Forms 
Figure 4.3 shows President Obama’s perceptual graph form. President Obama’s hidden states 
with their relative arcs are shown as white nodes and dimmed arcs. For instance, since state 28 is 
hidden in the eyes of President Obama, he would not see the possibility of  unilaterally 
improving to state 27 or other DMs unilaterally moving to states 14, 21, 24, or 26. 
    Figure 4.4 is the Canadian Coalition’s perceived graph form. As shown, states 15, 18, 22, and 
25 are hidden in its viewpoint.  Therefore, all the transitions passing through the mentioned 
states are dimmed. Since this study has assumed that Republicans have perceived all the feasible 
states, their integrated graph form is the same as the standard graph form shown in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 4.5 is NDEQ’s perceptual integrated graph form in which it does not perceive states 2 and 
9.  
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Figure 4.3: President Obama’s Perceptual Graph Form; 
DM1: President Obama, DM2: Canadian Coalition, DM3: Republicans, DM4: NDEQ. Note: The relations 
between the arcs are all bidirectional. 
 
 
82 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Canadian Coalition’s Perceptual Graph Form; 
DM1: President Obama, DM2: Canadian Coalition, DM3: Republicans, DM4: NDEQ. Note: The relations 
between the arcs are all bidirectional. 
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Figure 4.5: NDEQ’s Perceptual Graph Form; 
DM1: President Obama, DM2: Canadian Coalition, DM3: Republicans, DM4: NDEQ. Note: The relations 
between the arcs are all bidirectional. 
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4.6. Perceptual Stability Analysis 
One of the key components of the perceptual graph model technique is consideration of the 
awareness of each DM regarding other DMs’ strategies. Drawing on DMs’ recognized and 
hidden states and particular solution concepts defined in Appendix B, perceptual stability 
analysis is conducted for each DM to form separate private and overall sets of stable states. 
Assuming that k is a particular DM,       represents a situation in which that particular DM is 
aware of other DMs’ perceptions. On the other hand,       denotes the condition where the 
DM is not aware of other DMs’ strategies.  
4.6.1. Perceptual Solution Concepts 
Nash, GMR, SMR and SEQ, as defined in Table 3.6 of Chapter 3, are important solution 
concepts that are used in both standard and perceptual graph model techniques. In addition to 
these four widely accepted solution concepts, Table 4.8 lists other rules needed for analyzing the 
proposed model based on the perceptual graph technique. DMs’ options and strategies have been 
assessed separately based on these seven solution concepts and also in regard to each DM’s 
awareness status.   
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Table 4.8: Perceptual Solution Concepts in Addition to Nash, GMR, SMR and SEQ (Also desciribed in 
Appendix B) (Obeidi et al., 2009)  
Solution Concepts Descriptions 
Stability by Default (Default) 
“where the focal DM i has no option to accept 
the current state because there exists no 
adjacent state that i can move to. Note that 
DM k assesses the reachable list, Ri(s), for the 
focal DMi that is located in Sk. A special case 
occurs when DM k is aware of some adjacent 
states that are invisible to focal DM i. Hence, 
k knows that the current state appears to be 
default stable for DM i, although in reality it is 
not”. If a focal DM cannot unilaterally move 
from current state, the state by default is stable 
for that DM. 
Apparent Default Stability (A Default) 
If a focal DM cannot unilaterally move from 
current state, because the DM’s perceptions of 
his/her own possible moves are limited the 
state is apparently default stable for that DM. 
Therefore, “A default” stability is not 
considered for the owner of the perceptual 
graph model when the DM is aware of other 
DMs’ perceptions. 
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Apparently Perceived Nash Stability  
(A Nash) 
“Although DM i can move unilaterally from 
the current state, all UIs are apprehended by 
DM j but not by the focal DM I whose 
perception is limited. Note that apparent Nash 
stability 
does not apply to the focal DM who owns the 
graph model, since DM i’s awareness would 
be equal to DM k’s. Therefore, apparent 
stability applies only for a focal DM with 
limited perception”. 
 
4.7. Meta-Stability Analysis 
The results of the individual perceptual stability analysis depend highly on the awareness status 
of the focal DM. After each DM’s individual stability analysis has been conducted through the 
use of standard and perceptual solution concepts, a meta-stability analysis would be 
implemented. In this second phase, the private and overall stabilities are consolidated, which 
provides a thorough understanding of the conflict. Concepts such as stationary equilibrium, 
transitory equilibrium, stationary pseudo-equilibrium, and transitory pseudo-equilibrium, which 
are defined in Section 4.6.1 and summarized in Table 4.9, are used to conduct meta-stability 
analysis in phase two of the perceptual stability analysis. 
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Table 4.9: Properties of Meta-Stability Analysis under Variants of Awareness and Perception 
 
 
In some but not all 
variants of awareness 
In all variants of 
awareness 
Perceived by all DMs 
Transitory Equilibrium 
 
Stationary Equilibrium 
 
Perceived by some but 
not all DMs 
Transitory Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
 
Stationary Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
 
 
4.7.1. Standard or Stationary Equilibrium 
Similar to the standard graph model technique, states that are stable for all DMs are standard 
equilibria. However, overall stable states must be recognized by all DMs in the conflict in 
perceptual graph model analysis; these states describe the most robust resolutions that satisfy all 
solution concepts under all variants of awareness.  
4.7.2. Transitory Equilibrium 
If a state is perceived by all DMs and satisfies particular solution concepts under some variants 
of awareness, that state will be labeled as a transitory equilibrium.  
4.7.3. Stationary Pseudo-Equilibrium 
Pseudo-equilibrium occurs when a state is not recognized by all DMs, but is stable under 
particular solution concepts for some DMs who perceive it. These states are not sustainable 
resolutions because some DMs do not recognize them. Although a pseudo-equilibrium state 
tends to satisfy only short-term resolutions of the conflict, it could turn into a long-term outcome 
if the DMs who perceive it insist on staying in that situation and not moving away from it.  
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4.7.4. Transitory Pseudo-Equilibrium 
The definition of this kind of equilibrium is similar to that of stationary pseudo-equilibrium. The 
only difference is that transitory pseudo-equilibrium is defined only in some variants of 
awareness, while stationary pseudo-equilibrium considers all variants of awareness. In other 
words, a state can be a stationary pseudo-equilibrium when the DM is both aware and not aware 
of others’ perceptions. However, this state would be considered as a transitory pseudo-
equilibrium if the DM is either aware or not aware (but not both) of other DMs’ perceptions. 
4.8. Perceptual Stability Analysis and the Keystone XL Pipeline Strategic Conflict 
Now this study proceeds to implementing the perceptual graph model technique to analyze the 
Keystone XL pipeline dispute. As shown in Figure 4.6, the circles represent state numbers. 
Recognized states have been shown by     . Since Republicans perceive all the recognized 
states, these states are also representative of Republicans’ perceived states. The Canadian 
Coalition recognizes all states except states 15, 18, 22, and 25. The mentioned states are assumed 
to be hidden for the Canadian Coalition and are presented as      in Figure 4.6. Moreover, the 
Canadian Coalition’s perceived states are shown by      in that         . Hidden states in 
President Obama’s viewpoint are represented as      and NDEQ’s hidden states are presented 
as     . Also, states that are perceived or recognized by President Obama are shown by      
and NDEQ’s recognized states have been indicated by     . 
    Figure 4.7 represents President Obama’s awareness regarding other DMs’ viewpoints. 
When    , President Obama is aware of the Canadian Coalition’s and NDEQ’s recognized 
and hidden states. Therefore, in this scenario, President Obama is aware that the Canadian 
Coalition does not see states 15, 18, 22, and 25 and that NDEQ does not see states 2 and 9. The 
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Canadian Coalition’s and NDEQ’s hidden states have been written in gray (as opposed to black). 
As mentioned earlier, states 7, 14, 21, and 28 are hidden in President Obama’s point of view and, 
thus, have been removed from President Obama’s perceptual graph model in Figure 4.7. 
    If President Obama is not aware       of other DMs’ perceptions, these DMs’ hidden states 
would be present and considered in President Obama’s perceptual graph model. Since all states 
are recognized by Republicans, they do not affect other DMs’ perceptual graph models in 
different awareness circumstances.  
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Figure 4.7: President Obama’s Awareness Regarding Other DM’s Perceptions; 
When    , he is aware that Canadian Coalition does not see states 15, 18, 22, 25. Also, he knows that NDEQ 
does not see states 2 and 9. States 7, 14, 21, and 28 are not perceived by President Obama himself. 
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Tables 4.10 and 4.11 are perceptual graphs in terms of President Obama’s point of view 
toward the Keystone conflict. States that are not perceived by President Obama have been 
highlighted in gray. In the former table, he is aware       that other DMs do not see some 
particular states, while in the latter table he does not perceive other DMs’ hidden states      . 
    In standard graph model, President Obama can unilaterally move from state 6 to state 7. 
However, since in perceptual graph model state 7 is a hidden state in President Obama’s point of 
view, he would stay in state 6. State 6 is considered as default stable for President Obama and 
thus, there is no need to assess this state under the remaining solution concepts. State 13 is also a 
default stable state for President Obama since he does not perceive state 14 as a recognized state 
and, thus, does not move away from state 13 to state 14. The cells that contain a forward slash 
represent the states that have not been assessed.  
    State 20 is apparently default stable for the Canadian Coalition in Table 4.10. Since President 
Obama is aware that the Canadian Coalition does not perceive state 15, in his point of view, 
Canada would not move from state 20 to state 15. Therefore, state 20 becomes apparently default 
stable for the Canadian Coalition in President Obama’s viewpoint.  
. 
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Table 4.10: Stability Analysis Based on Perceptual Graph Model Technique in President Obama’s Point of View (α=1) 
President Obama’s 
viewpoint  (α=1) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
President 
Obama 
Default N N N N N Y  N N N N N Y  N N N N N Y  N N N N N Y  
A 
Default 
/ / 
/ 
/ / /  / / / / / /  / / / / / /  / / / / / /  
Nash N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  
A Nash / / / / / /  / / / / / /  / / / / / /  / / / / / /  
GMR N Y SAUN Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  
SEQ N Y SAUN Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  
SMR N Y Y Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  
Canadian 
Coalition 
Default N Y N N N N  N Y N N N N  / Y N / N N  / Y N / N N  
A 
Default 
N / 
N 
N N N  N / N N N N  / / N / N Y  / / N / N Y  
Nash N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  / / Y / N /  / / Y / N /  
A Nash N / N N N N  N / N N N N  / / N / N /  / / N / N /  
GMR N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  / / Y / N /  / / Y / N /  
SEQ N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  / / Y / N /  / / Y / N /  
SMR N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  / / Y / N /  / / Y / N /  
Republicans Default N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  
A 
Default 
N N 
N 
N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  
Nash N N N N N N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  N N N N N N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
A Nash N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  
GMR Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
SEQ Y N N Y Y N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y N N Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
SMR Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
NDEQ Default N / N N N N  N / N N N N  N N N N N Y  N N N N N N  
A 
Default 
N / 
N 
N N N  N / N N N N  N Y N N N N  N Y N N N N  
Nash N / N N N N  N / N N N N  Y / Y Y Y Y  Y / Y Y Y Y  
A Nash N / N N N N  N / N N N N  N / N N N N  N / N N N N  
GMR Y / N Y N Y  Y / Y Y N Y  Y / Y Y Y Y  Y / Y Y Y Y  
SEQ Y / N Y N N  Y / Y N N N  Y / Y Y Y Y  Y / Y Y Y Y  
SMR Y / N Y N Y  Y / Y Y N Y  Y / Y Y Y Y  Y / Y Y Y Y  
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Table 4.11: Stability Analysis Based on Perceptual Graph Model Technique in President Obama’s Point of View (α=0) 
President Obama’s 
viewpoint (α=0) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
President 
Obama 
Default N N N N N Y  N N N N N Y  N N N N N Y  N N N N N Y  
Nash N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  
GMR N Y Y Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  
SEQ N Y Y Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  
SMR N Y Y Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  N Y N Y N /  
Canadian 
Coalition 
Default N Y N N N N  N Y N N N N  N Y N N N N  N Y N N N N  
Nash N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  
GMR N / Y N N Y  N / Y N Y Y  N / Y N N Y  N / Y N Y Y  
SEQ N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  N / Y N N Y  
SMR N / Y N N Y  N / Y N Y Y  N / Y N N Y  N / Y N Y Y  
Republicans Default N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  
Nash N N N N N N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  N N N N N N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
GMR Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
SEQ Y N N Y Y N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y N N Y Y N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
SMR Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
NDEQ Default N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N  
Nash N N N N N N  N N N N N N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
GMR Y N Y Y Y Y  Y N Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
SEQ Y N Y N Y N  Y N Y N Y N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
SMR Y N Y Y Y Y  Y N Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  
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    According to Table 4.10, states 9, 23, 25, and 27 are overall stable under Nash, GMR, SMR, 
and SEQ solution concepts. However, as revealed by perceptual graph model solution concepts, 
states 9 and 25 are transitory pseudo-equilibrium states when President Obama is aware of other 
DMs’ perceived states in Table 4.10. State 9 represents the situation where President Obama 
approves the project under Republicans’ pressure, but NDEQ does not pressure him about this 
decision. Moreover, state 25 describes the condition where President Obama rejects the project, 
while the Canadian Coalition stops insisting on its approval, but does not diversify its oil sands 
bitumen to Asian markets. As mentioned earlier, state 9 is a hidden state for NDEQ and state 25 
is a hidden state for the Canadian Coalition. Therefore, the conclusion that states 9 and 25 are 
stable states may mislead President Obama in making decisions regarding the other DMs.  
    As shown in Table 4.10, President Obama perceives state 3 as GMR and SEQ strategic 
advantage unstable (SAUN). According to the standard graph model summarized in Table 4.3, if 
President Obama is not aware of NDEQ’s recognized states, he would not know that state 2 is a 
hidden state in NDEQ’s perspective. In this case (    for President Obama), he would be 
worried to move from state 3 to state 2 since he thinks that he would be sanctioned by NDEQ. 
However, if President Obama is aware of NDEQ’s hidden states, he could improve to state 2 
without any concern of sanctions from NDEQ. Moreover, in Table 4.10, state 18 is stable under 
all solution concepts for all DMs, except Nash stability for Republicans; thus, this state is a 
transitory equilibrium in President Obama’s perspective.  
    In Table 4.11, since state 7 is hidden for President Obama and, thus, he would not move away 
from state 6 to state 7, state 6 is default stable for him. Consequently, there is no need to assess 
state 6 for stability under the other solution concepts. Likewise, states 13, 20, and 27 are also 
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default stable for President Obama. This is because states 14, 21, and 28 are not perceived by 
President Obama and, thus, he would not move away from states 13, 20, and 27 to the mentioned 
three states. Table 4.12 summarizes equilibrium results in President Obama’s perceptual graph 
models. 
Table 4.12: Equilibrium Outcomes of President Obama’s Perceptual Graph Models 
 
 
 
    Tables 4.13 and 4.14 are perceptual graphs with respect to the Canadian Coalition’s viewpoint 
regarding the Keystone conflict. In Table 4.13, the Canadian Coalition is aware       of other 
DMs’ perceptions. However, in Table 4.14, it is not aware       of other DMs’ inconspicuous 
states. Columns shown in gray are not perceived by the DM to which the table belongs (e.g., 15, 
18, 22, and 25 in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 are hidden in the Canada Coalition’s viewpoint). 
   Apparent Nash stability has not been explored for the owner of the perceptual graph model. In 
Table 4.13, which belongs to the Canadian Coalition with    , state 26 is apparently Nash 
stable for President Obama. State 26 is an unstable state in his point of view and, thus, he may 
decide to move away from it to state 25. But since the Canadian Coalition does not perceive state 
25 as a recognized state (i.e., it is hidden in its perspective), President Obama cannot move from 
state 26 to any other state from the Canadian Coalition’s viewpoint. Therefore, state 26 is 
interpreted to be Nash stable for President Obama in the Canadian Coalition’s perspective. In 
this situation, state 26 is defined as an apparently Nash stable state for President Obama. 
President 
Obama 
 
Stationary 
Equilibrium 
Transitory 
Equilibrium 
Stationary 
Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
Transitory 
Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
      
23, 27 
- 
- 
- 
      18 9 , 25 
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    As perceived by the Canadian Coalition in Table 4.13, states 5, 12, 19, and 26 are GMR and 
SEQ SAUN. The Canadian Coalition can improve from the mentioned states to states 7, 14, 21, 
and 28. However, in Table 4.13, these target states are not perceived by President Obama and the 
Canadian Coalition is aware of this issue. Therefore, the Canadian Coalition has the advantage of 
not being worried about sanctions by the US.  
    According to the graph form in Figure 4.3, President Obama can move from state 6 to state 7. 
However, since in Table 4.13, the Canadian Coalition is aware that President Obama does not 
perceive state 7, state 6 becomes apparently default stable for him in the Canadian Coalition’s 
perceptual graph. 
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Table 4.13: Stability Analysis Based on Perceptual Graph Model Technique in Canadian Coalition’s Point of View (α=1) 
Canadian Coalition’s 
viewpoint  (α=1) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
President 
Obama 
Default N N N N N N / N N N N N N /  N N  N N /  N N  N N / 
A 
Default 
N N N N N Y / N N N N N Y /  N N  Y Y /  N N  Y Y / 
Nash N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / /  Y N  / / /  Y N  N / / 
A Nash N N N N N / / N N N N N / /  N N  / / /  N N  Y / / 
GMR N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / /  Y N  / / /  Y N  Y / / 
SEQ N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / /  Y N  / / /  Y N  Y / / 
SMR N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / /  Y N  / / /  Y N  Y / / 
Canadian 
Coalition 
Default N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N  Y N  N Y N  Y N  N Y N 
A 
Default 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / /  / / /  / /  / / / 
Nash N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N  / Y  N / N  / Y  N / N 
A Nash / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / /  / / /  / /  / / / 
GMR N / Y N SAUN Y Y N / Y N SAUN Y Y  / Y  SAUN / N  / Y  SAUN / Y 
SEQ N / Y N SAUN Y N N / Y N SAUN Y N  / Y  SAUN / N  / Y  SAUN / N 
SMR N / Y N N Y Y N / Y N N Y Y  / Y  N / N  / Y  N / Y 
Republicans Default N N N N N N N N N N N N N N  N N  N N N  N N  N N N 
A 
Default 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N  N N  N N N  N N  N N N 
Nash N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  N N  N N N  Y Y  Y Y Y 
A Nash N N N N N N N N N N N N N N  N N  N N N  N N  N N N 
GMR Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y N  Y Y  Y Y Y 
SEQ Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  N N  Y N N  Y Y  Y Y Y 
SMR Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y N  Y Y  Y Y Y 
NDEQ Default N / N N N N N N / N N N N N  N N  N N N  N N  N N N 
A 
Default 
Y / N Y N N N Y / N Y N N N  Y N  N N N  Y N  N N N 
Nash / / N / N N N / / N / N N N  / Y  Y Y Y  / Y  Y Y Y 
A Nash / / N / N N N / / N / N N N  / N  N N N  / N  N N N 
GMR / / Y / Y Y Y / / Y / Y Y Y  / Y  Y Y Y  / Y  Y Y Y 
SEQ / / Y / Y N Y / / Y / Y N Y  / Y  Y Y Y  / Y  Y Y Y 
SMR / / Y / Y Y Y / / Y / Y Y Y  / Y  Y Y Y  / Y  Y Y Y 
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Table 4.14: Stability Analysis Based on Perceptual Graph Model Technique in Canadian Coalition’s Point of View (α = 0) 
 
Canadian Coalition’s 
viewpoint (α=0) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
President 
Obama 
Default N N N N N N N N N N N N N N  N N  Y N N  N N  Y N N 
Nash N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N  Y N  / Y N  Y N  / Y N 
GMR N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N  Y N  / Y N  Y N  / Y N 
SEQ N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N  Y N  / Y N  Y N  / Y N 
SMR N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N  Y N  / Y N  Y N  / Y N 
Canadian 
Coalition 
Default N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N  Y N  N Y N  Y N  N Y N 
Nash N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N  / Y  N / N  / Y  N / N 
GMR N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y  / Y  Y / Y  / Y  Y / Y 
SEQ N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N  / Y  N / N  / Y  N / N 
SMR N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y  / Y  Y / Y  / Y  Y / Y 
Republicans Default N N N N N N N N N N N N N N  N N  N N N  N N  N N N 
Nash N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  N N  N N N  Y Y  Y Y Y 
GMR Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y N  Y Y  Y Y Y 
SEQ Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  N N  Y N N  Y Y  Y Y Y 
SMR Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y N  Y Y  Y Y Y 
NDEQ Default Y N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N  N N  N N N  N N  N N N 
Nash / N N / N N N / N N / N N N  Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y 
GMR / N Y / Y Y Y / N Y / Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y 
SEQ / N Y / Y N Y / N Y / Y N Y  Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y 
SMR / N Y / Y Y Y / N Y / Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y 
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Table 4.15: Equilibrium Outcomes of Canadian Coalition’s Graph Models 
 
 
 
 
    State 9 is privately stable for the Canadian Coalition according to Table 4.13. However, since 
NDEQ does not perceive state 9, this state is a transitory pseudo-equilibrium in the Canadian 
Coalition’s point of view. Although project approval is a favorable situation for the Canadian 
Coalition, NDEQ being silent is less likely to occur. In the real world, state 9 could only be an 
intermediary state for NDEQ, meaning that it may make a unilateral improvement to state 23. 
Table 4.15 summarizes the equilibria results of Tables 4.13 and 4.14. 
    Republicans’ perceptual graphs are summarized in Tables 4.16 and 4.17. In the former table, 
Republicans are aware of the other DMs’ perceived and not perceived states, while in the latter, 
they have not perceived other DMs’ hidden states. According to the study’s assumption, 
Republicans are the only DMs that have perceived all the feasible states. 
Canadian 
Coalition 
 
Stationary 
Equilibrium 
Transitory 
Equilibrium 
Stationary 
Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
Transitory 
Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
      
23 , 27 
- 
- 
- 
      - 9 
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Table 4.16: Stability Analysis Based on Perceptual Graph Model Technique in Republican’s Point of View (α=1)
Republicans viewpoint  
(α=1) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
President 
Obama 
Default N N N N N N / N N N N N N / N N N N N N / N N N N N N / 
A 
Default 
N N N N N Y / N N N N N Y / N N N N N Y / N N N N N Y / 
Nash N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / 
A Nash N N N N N / / N N Y N N / / N N N N N / / N N N N N / / 
GMR N Y Y Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / 
SEQ N Y Y Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / 
SMR N Y Y Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / 
Canadian 
Coalition 
Default N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N / Y N / N N N / Y N / N N N 
A 
Default 
N / N N N N N N / N N N N N / / N / N Y N / / N / N Y N 
Nash N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N / / Y / N / N / / Y / N / N 
A Nash N / N N N N N N / N N N N N / / N / N / N / / N / N / N 
GMR Y / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y / / Y / Y / Y / / Y / N / Y 
SEQ Y / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N / / Y / N / N / / Y / N / N 
SMR Y / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y / / Y / Y / Y / / Y / N / Y 
Republicans Default N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N 
A 
Default 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Nash N N N N N N N Y / Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y Y / Y Y Y 
A Nash / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
GMR Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y SAUN Y Y N Y Y Y / Y Y Y 
SEQ Y N N Y Y N N Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y N N SAUN Y N N Y Y Y / Y Y Y 
SMR Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y / Y Y Y 
NDEQ Default N / N N N N N N / N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
A 
Default 
N / N N N N N N / N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N 
Nash N / N N N N N N / N N N N N Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
A Nash N / N N N N N N / N N N N N N / N N N N N N / N N N N N 
GMR Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
SEQ Y / Y N N N Y Y / Y Y Y N Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
SMR Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 4.17: Stability Analysis Based on Perceptual Graph Model Technique in Republicans’ Point of View (α=0) 
 
Republicans  viewpoint 
(α=0) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
President 
Obama 
Default N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Nash N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N 
GMR N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N 
SEQ N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N 
SMR N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N 
Canadian 
Coalition 
Default N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N 
Nash N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N 
GMR N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N N Y Y 
SEQ N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N 
SMR N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N N Y Y 
Republicans Default N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Nash N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
GMR Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SEQ Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SMR Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
NDEQ Default N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Nash N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
GMR Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SEQ Y N Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SMR Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 4.18: Equilibrium Outcomes of Republicans’ Graph Models 
Republicans 
 
Stationary 
Equilibrium 
Transitory 
Equilibrium 
Stationary 
Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
Transitory 
Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
      
23 , 27 
- 
- 
- 
      - 9 , 25 
 
    As indicated in Table 4.18, states 23 and 27 are overall equilibria under all variants of 
awareness for Republicans. State 9 is Republicans’ favorite situation. State 9 reflects the 
situation where President Obama approves the project under Republicans’ pressure with no 
objection from NDEQ. Although this state satisfies all solution concepts in Republicans’ 
perceptual graph, it is hidden in NDEQ’s point of view and, thus, is a transitory pseudo-
equilibrium.  
    As shown in Tables 4.19 and 4.20, which are NDEQ perceptual graphs, states 23 and 27 are 
overall equilibria in NDEQ’s point of view because they satisfy all the main solution concepts. In 
the former table, NDEQ is aware of the other DMs’ perceptions regarding the Keystone XL 
conflict, while in the latter it has not perceived other DMs’ hidden states. States 2 and 9 are 
shown in gray columns and are not perceived (i.e., are hidden) by NDEQ. 
     In Table 4.19, state 10 is stable under particular solution concepts (GMR, SMR, and SEQ, but 
not Nash) in the view of NDEQ and President Obama. Since NDEQ is aware that states 15 and 
22 are not perceived by the Canadian Coalition, NDEQ can have UIs from states 1 and 8 to states 
15 and 22. Thus, states 1 and 8 are SAUN under GMR and SMR solution concepts. 
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Table 4.19: Stability Analysis Based on Perceptual Graph Model Technique in NDEQ’s Point of View (α=1) 
NDEQ’S viewpoint  
(α=1) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
President 
Obama 
Default N  N N N N / N  N N N N / N N N N N N / N N N N N N / 
A 
Default 
N  N N N Y / N  N N N Y / N N N N N Y / N N N N N Y / 
Nash N  N Y N / / N  N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / 
A Nash N  N N N / / N  N N N / / N N N N N / / N N N N N / / 
GMR N  Y Y N / / Y  Y Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / 
SEQ N  Y Y N / / Y  Y Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / 
SMR N  Y Y N / / Y  Y Y N / / N Y N Y N / / N Y N Y N / / 
Canadian 
Coalition 
Default N  N N N N N N  N N N N N / Y N / N N N / Y N / N N N 
A 
Default 
N  N N N N N N  N N N N N / / N / N Y N / / N / N Y N 
Nash N  Y N N Y N N  Y N N Y N / / Y / N / N / / Y / N / N 
A Nash N  N N N N N N  N N N N N / / N / N / N / / N / N / N 
GMR N  Y N Y Y Y N  Y N Y Y Y / / Y / Y / Y / / Y / N / Y 
SEQ N  Y N N Y N N  Y N N Y N / / Y / N / N / / N / N / N 
SMR N  Y N Y Y Y N  Y N Y Y Y / / Y / Y / Y / / Y / N /  Y 
Republicans Default N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
A 
Default 
N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Nash N  N N N N N Y  Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
A Nash N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
GMR Y  Y Y Y Y N Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SEQ Y  N Y Y N N Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SMR Y  Y Y Y Y N Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
NDEQ Default N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N 
A 
Default 
/  / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Nash N  N N N N N N  N N N N N Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
A Nash /  / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
GMR SAUN  y Y Y Y Y SAUN  Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
SEQ SAUN  Y N N N Y SAUN  Y N Y N Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
SMR N  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 4.20: Stability Analysis Based on Perceptual Graph Model Technique in NDEQ’s Point of View (α=0) 
NDEQ’S viewpoint (α=0) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
President 
Obama 
Default N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Nash N  Y Y N Y N N  Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N y N 
GMR N  Y Y N Y N Y  Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N 
SEQ N  Y Y N Y N Y  Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N 
SMR N  Y Y N Y N Y  Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N 
Canadian 
Coalition 
Default N  N N N N N N  Y N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N 
Nash N  Y N N Y N N  Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N 
GMR N  Y N Y Y Y N  Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N N Y Y 
SEQ N  Y N N Y N N  Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N N / Y N N Y N 
SMR N  Y N Y Y Y N  Y N Y Y Y N / Y N Y Y Y N / Y N N Y Y 
Republicans Default N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Nash N  N N N N N Y  Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
GMR Y  Y Y Y Y N Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SEQ Y  N Y Y N N Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SMR Y  Y Y Y Y N Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
NDEQ Default N  N N N N N N  N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N N N 
Nash N  N N N N N N  N N N N N Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
GMR Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
SEQ Y  Y N N N Y Y  Y N Y N Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
SMR Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y Y 
106 
 
    As shown in Table 4.21, states 10 and 18 satisfy all solution concepts except Nash 
equilibrium. State 10 is a transitory equilibrium under all variants of NDEQ awareness, while 
state 18 is only a transitory equilibrium when NDEQ is aware of other DMs’ hidden states.  
Table 4.21: Equilibrium Outcomes of NDEQ’s Graph Models 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9. Overall Equilibrium Resulting from Meta-Stability Analysis 
According to Table 4.22, states 23 and 27 are stationary equilibria for all the DMs since they 
satisfy all solution concepts in all DMs’ perceptual graphs in all variants of awareness. The 
mentioned states were also overall stable in the standard graph model summarized in Table 4.5. 
State 27 represents a situation in which President Obama rejects the project under pressure from 
the NDEQ. In this situation, the Canadian Coalition diversifies its oil sands bitumen to Asia and 
no longer tries to convince its important customer, the US. This leads to extreme pressure from 
Republicans who agree with construction of the Keystone XL pipeline because of its economic 
benefits.  
    On the other hand, since the DOS indicated in its latest EIS report that the project satisfies US 
national interests, it seems that President Obama would eventually approve the project, as 
indicated in state 23. However, the approval could be conditional. Both Canada and the US could 
agree on some modifications to mitigate the environmental impacts of proceeding with the 
NDEQ 
 
Stationary 
Equilibrium 
Transitory 
Equilibrium 
Stationary 
Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
Transitory 
Pseudo-
Equilibrium 
      
23 , 27 
10 
- 
- 
      10 , 18 25 
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project. However, these modifications would not be so major that TransCanada would need to 
reapply for a presidential permit.  
    State 10 satisfied all solution concepts except Nash stability in all DMs’ viewpoints in some 
variants of awareness. Therefore, it is a transitory equilibrium state for all the DMs. Although 
state 18 is a transitory equilibrium in President Obama’s and NDEQ’s graph models, this state is 
not perceived (i.e., is hidden) by the Canadian Coalition. Therefore, in Table 4.22, only state 10 
is regarded as an overall transitory equilibrium state. 
    State 10 expresses the situation where President Obama requests major modifications from the 
Canadian Coalition. Since NDEQ prefers that the project be either canceled by the Canadian 
Coalition or rejected by President Obama, a modification request is a relatively preferred 
condition in NDEQ’s point of view. State 10 has the potential to provide a peaceful resolution if 
the Canadian Coalition decides to modify the project to maintain the US as its main customer. 
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Table 4.22: Summary of Meta-Stability Analysis of the Keystone XL Pipeline 
 
 
In some but not all variants of 
awareness 
In all variants of awareness 
Perceived by all DMs 
Transitory equilibrium 
Nash: none 
GMR,SMR,SEQ: 10 
Stationary equilibrium 
Nash: 23, 27 
GMR,SMR,SEQ: 23, 27 
Perceived by some but not all DMs 
Transitory pseudo-equilibrium 
Nash:9,25 
GMR,SMR,SEQ: 9,25 
Stationary pseudo-equilibrium 
Nash: none 
GMR,SMR,SEQ: none 
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    State 9 is not perceived by NDEQ, but satisfies all solution concepts for other DMs under 
some variants of awareness        Also, the Canadian Coalition does not perceive state 25 
while this state is an equilibrium for other DMs when      . Both states 9 and 25 are 
transitory pseudo-equilibria in at least one DM’s point of view. Thus, if they are attained, they 
might mislead the focal DM in its policy making since these states are not perceived by a DM in 
the conflict. Moreover, in this case study, the meta-stability analysis did not reveal a state 
eligible to be considered as a stationary pseudo-equilibrium state. 
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Chapter Five: Strategic Insights, 
Limitations, Conclusions, and Future Studies  
5.1. Strategic Insights 
Canada is considered a rich country in terms of energy, natural and technological resources. It is 
necessary to adopt an integrated view with regard to its energy assets. In line with this purpose, a 
systematic point of view can certainly be beneficial economically and environmentally  
(Canadian Academy of Engineering Energy Pathways Task Force, 2012a).  
The purpose of this systematic analysis here is to carry out a formal study of the Keystone XL 
pipeline dispute to gain a better understanding and strategic insights. The insights drawn from 
the study with the assistance of the graph model technique show the credibility of a wide range 
of capabilities of this technique. Based on a thorough literature review, coupled with the 
development of conflict models and associated analyses, a range of valuable insights are gained 
by carrying this type of comprehensive conflict study.  
Although the US and Canada are bonded neighboring countries and have the same goal of 
going forward with the project, many complexities and obstacles have arisen in the process of 
conducting the project. Even though the two countries have friendly relations, financial strains 
have affected this relationship to the extent that Canada is opening its energy resources to Asian 
markets.  
The Keystone XL project model further helps the DMs to analyze the strategic conflict and to 
predict other players’ movements and strategies. For example, the analysis reveals that the initial 
rejection of the project by President Obama could be considered a wise decision. Although the 
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likelihood of exporting Canada’s oil sands bitumen to other markets is high, President Obama 
knew that the Canadian Coalition is aware of the many environmental impacts of the original 
Keystone XL pipeline proposal (Gasser, 2012). Consequently, in May of 2012, TransCanada 
applied again for a Presidential Permit for a rerouted Keystone XL pipeline project. In line with 
President Obama’s preference, Canada did not diversify its oil sands bitumen to Asian markets, 
even after many statements of its intention to do so. To preserve environmentalist support, 
President Obama also managed to defer a decision on the project to after the presidential election 
of 2012. On the other hand, the Republicans were aware of the reasons behind this decision and 
thus continued pressuring President Obama. 
One of the important contributions of applying both standard and perceptual graph model 
techniques to the Keystone XL project is to understand the dynamic complexity of the multi-
participant, multi-objective decision-making process, and the importance of timing. The model 
not only gives an understanding of the situation at a single point in time, but it can also 
effectively provide quick support to policy and governance by being revised based on new 
circumstances to determine the implications. For instance, after Canada’s decision to diversify 
oil sands bitumen to China, rankings of DMs’ preferences changed in the proposed model. 
Requesting modification had been a high priority for the US, but after the initial rejection of the 
proposal by President Obama, when Canada announced multiple times that it would diversify its 
oil to regions such as Asia, the risk of possible negative outcomes of modification increased in 
US’s point of view. Thus, US’s preference rankings were altered. This change in preferences can 
be effectively addressed through the graph model technique.  
The other insightful conclusion the graph model technique sheds light on is that a short-term 
perspective towards decision making might not be an ideal strategy for maximum gains. For 
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example, in the case of sequentially sanctioned states for a particular DM, although a DM makes 
a transition to a more preferred state in the first move, in the long run, the conflict will end up in 
a less preferred equilibrium state for that DM. For example, according to Table 3.7 in the case of 
state 18, although President Obama makes a short-term improvement by transitioning to state 17, 
because of the unilateral improvements of other DMs, it will see itself in the equilibrium state of 
21 after a few transitions. Hence, the graph model technique gives a unique opportunity to DMs 
to foresee different consequences of their decisions and to take appropriate action towards 
attaining long-term profits instead of short-term and temporary accomplishments.  
As discussed before, DOS is responsible for preparing EIS, which refers to investigating the 
environmental impacts of the project. DOS should receive comments from the public, states, and 
tribal and federal agencies. In November of 2011, after evaluating the public’s points of view, 
DOS declared that, to determine the final national decision, it was necessary for the project to be 
in compliance with various states’ regulations along the pipeline route. However, DOS pointed 
out that the differences in the states’ laws, criteria and standards are sources of confusion that 
add to the complexity of the conflict (Parfomak et al., 2011). Additionally, TransCanada should 
also pay taxes to different states of the US due to imperfections in the states’ laws, criteria and 
standards. Therefore, this issue could add to the dissatisfaction amongst stakeholders, such as 
DOS and the Canadian Coalition, further contributing to the complexity of the conflict. By 
investigating and bringing up these challenges for the DMs, the graph model technique could 
help policymakers to enhance the current local, national and international laws to support 
environmental sustainability and to meet social and economic demands from their societies and 
the stakeholders. 
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     Based on the perceptual graph model technique’s results, if the Canadian Coalition gets 
serious about exporting oil sands bitumen to Asia, President Obama would have to deal with a 
sensitive situation.  Rejection or even requesting major modifications regarding the Keystone XL 
project may lead to dismissal of the project by the Canadian Coalition. The Canadian Coalition 
would likely even diversify its oil sands bitumen to the US’s rival countries.  
    Although environmentalists would be appeased by President Obama’s decision, this rejection 
could affect two bonded neighboring countries’ relations in different fields, such as economics 
and politics. Moreover, Republicans would not be satisfied since in their view thousands of job 
opportunities would be lost and worse, dependence on the Middle East for imported energy 
would increase. On the other hand, if President Obama approves the project, not only would 
environmentalists object, but the US would be under increasing pressure from other countries to 
reconsider the pipeline’s negative environmental impacts on the globe. Therefore, it is critical for 
President Obama to be aware of other DMs’ preferences to make a wise decision. 
    As revealed by meta-stability analysis, states 23 and 27 are the most robust states in the 
proposed model. However, state 10 is also a nominee as a resolution for the Keystone XL 
conflict. The Canadian Coalition seems to be keen to remove the negative environmental impacts 
of the project. This concern could exist partly because diminishing the negative environmental 
effects would increase Canada’s credibility as an environment-friendly nation in the eyes of the 
world. Therefore, by pointing out the mentioned issue, President Obama could try to convince 
the Canadian Coalition to reconsider the current Keystone XL proposal.  
    The greater the number of DMs, the smaller the probability of finding a robust solution that 
meets all DMs’ preferences. However, when the DMs are aware of each other’s preferences and 
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hidden states, they can make wiser decisions in solving the conflict. Being aware of other DMs’ 
recognized states can increase the possibility of successful negotiations between the DMs.  
5.2. Limitations 
As discussed previously, identifying and sorting the feasible states in a proposed model is a 
subjective procedure based on the opinions and judgments of the researcher. Thus, it is important 
to find ways to decrease the bias associated with this subjectivity in standard and perceptual 
graph model techniques. 
    The perceptual graph model technique used in this study assumed two kinds of awareness for 
each DM. They were either aware of all other DMs’ hidden states or they were not. The 
combination of these two assumptions was not studied. For example, in one real-world scenario, 
President Obama as the focal DM can be aware of all other DMs’ hidden states. In another 
situation, he can be aware of only the Canadian Coalition’s hidden and recognized states. In a 
different scenario, he could be aware of the Canadian Coalition’s and NDEQ’s hidden states. 
Each of these scenarios would lead to different stability analysis results. Although this process 
could be time-consuming, it would ensure more accurate concluding remarks and analyses 
regarding the conflict.  
 
5.3. Conclusions 
Exporting bitumen from the oil sands in Canada through the Keystone XL pipeline is a 
controversial topic between Canada and the US. A strategic investigation to identify key factors 
– DMs, their options and preferences, feasible states, and transitions to more preferred states – is 
conducted to structure the model. Considering the different aspects of this conflict categorized 
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into environmental-social-health, political, and economic dimensions, this crucial real-world 
issue is systematically studied.  
The projected economic benefits of the Keystone XL conflict are in contradiction with the 
environmental preservation that the world currently needs. Using the graph model technique, the 
current study aims to provide a wise balance between these two sides. Therefore, in addition to 
facilitating communication and cooperation among DMs, the quality of understanding, 
negotiation and mediation among them would be enhanced. This enables a variety of groups, 
most importantly managers, to better understand and make decisions regarding operation and 
leadership of their organizations towards higher efficiency and productivity. In turn, with this 
systematic approach, environmental issues can also be addressed through undertaking a more 
sustainable approach. 
Moreover, most of the main and influential DMs of the studied conflict are local or 
governmental organizations. Also, some of the DMs consist of two or more organizations 
working together to make decisions. Therefore, this research can be useful in understanding the 
dynamics of the multi-participant decision-making process and how each party plays a role in the 
final decision.  
 
5.4. Future Studies 
Subjective analysis is used in some steps of the development of standard and perceptual graph 
models. This includes, but is not limited to, developing structured guidelines for gathering 
background information, determining main and influential DMs’ wants and needs, and ranking 
state preferences., Future research should focus on both standard and perceptual graph model 
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techniques’ processes and solution concepts’ definitions to obtain simpler, yet more objective 
definitions and procedures.   
    By means of increasing the objectiveness of standard and perceptual graph model techniques, 
it is recommended that the Keystone XL pipeline dispute be explored by other authors as well. 
Comparing the conclusions of all the studies on this specific conflict would enhance our 
understanding of the effects each author’s perception has on modeling and analyzing the conflict.  
    As indicated in the thesis, this controversial conflict is still an ongoing dispute. After President 
Obama’s decision on either approving or rejecting the Keystone XL pipeline project has been 
announced, a comparison between real world occurrences and the current study’s results needs to 
be conducted. This should provide an insight into standard and perceptual graph model 
techniques and would assist future researchers in modeling and analyzing other conflicts using 
these techniques. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Standard Graph Model 
Figure A1. Implementation of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
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Formal Definitions Regarding the Standard Graph Model for Conflict Resolution   
 
Definition 1. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
The set of all DMs is N, where |N| ≥ 2.  
The set of all states in the conflict is S, (S,  ), where 2 ≤ |S| ≤ N.  
For each DM i ∈ N,    ⊂ S × S is the set of state transitions or set of all arcs controlled by i. 
 (   ,   ) is an arc in DM i’s directed graph, if DM i can reach, in a one-step transition, state    
from state   . 
DM i’s preference on S is shown by a pair of binary relationships {   ,  } on S; where  
         means DM i prefers     to   , and         means DM i equally prefers    and   . The 
relationship          means that DM i prefers state    to    or equally prefers    and   .  
In a standard graph model, based on DM i’s elicited preferences over states, S can be partitioned 
into two sets, relative to a particular state s ∈ S (i.e., s is being assessed for stability), as follows: 
  
     = {   ∈ S :       s} is the set of all states that DM i prefers to state s; and   
     = {   ∈ 
S : s      } is the set of all states that DM i finds equally or less preferred to state s. Finally G= 
[N,S ,(       ,(       )], and is called a standard graph model. 
(1)    is asymmetric; hence, for all   ,    ∈ S,         and          cannot hold simultaneously. 
(2)    is reflexive; thus, for any    ∈ S,         . 
(3)    is symmetric; i.e, for all   ,    ∈ S, if            then           . 
(4) {  ,  } is complete; thus, for all   ,    ∈ S, exactly one of        ,          or          is 
true. 
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Definition 2. Reachable List 
For i ∈ N, and s ∈ S DM i’s reachable list from state s is the set    ∈ S|(     ) ∈     denoted by 
  (s) ⊂ S. When individual DMs unilaterally cause transitions among states from an initial state, 
or status quo, to a final state that is stable for all DMs.  
Definition 3. Unilateral Improvement (UI) List for each DM 
In the Graph Model, the set of all states that DM i can unilaterally reach from state s ∈ S in one 
step is the reachable list   (s). A UI from a particular state for a specific DM is a preferred state 
for that DM to which he or she can unilaterally move in one step.   (s)’s two subsets are:   
  (s) 
=   (s) ∩  
     is the set of all UIs from state s for DM i; and   (s) =   (s) ∩   
     is the set of 
all unilateral disimprovements and equally preferred states from state s for DM i. 
Definition 4. Nash Stability (Rationality) 
For i ∈ N, a state s ∈ S is Nash stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈        , iff   
  (s) = Ø. Under the 
Nash solution concept, a DM will move to a more preferred state whenever possible, without 
regard to any possible countermoves by the opponent. 
Definition 5. General Metarationality (GMR) 
For i ∈  N, a state s ∈  S is general metarational stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈      , iff for 
every t ∈   
  (s)  there exists    (t) ∩   
     ≠ Ø. Thus, a state s is general metarational stable for 
DM i iff for every UI i can take advantage of, the opponent, DM j, can subsequently move to a 
state that is at most as good for i as the original state s. 
Definition 6. Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 
For i ∈ N, a state s ∈ S is symmetric metarational stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈       , iff for 
every t ∈   
  (s),    (t)  ∩   
     ≠ Ø, and for all h ∈    (t) ∩   
    ,   (h)  ∩   
     = Ø. A state 
s is symmetric metarational stable for DM i iff not only every UI for i from s is sanctioned by the 
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opponent, but no unilateral counterresponse by DM i can leave it better off than the original state 
s. 
Definition 7. Sequential Stability (SEQ) 
For i ∈ N, a state s ∈ S is sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈        , iff for every t ∈   
  
(s) there exists   
  (t) ∩   
     ≠ Ø. A state s is sequentially stable for DM i iff every UI for i 
from s, state s is credibly sanctioned by the sanctioner DM j. 
 
Figure A2. Sample Individual Stability Using GMCRII Support System for Original Model in 
Chapter 3  
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Figure A3.Sample Overall Stability Using GMCRII Support System for Original Model in 
Chapter 3  
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Figure A4. Sample Overall Stability Using GMCRII Support System for Second Scenario in 
Sensitivity Analysis in Chapter 3  
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Appendix B: Perceptual Graph Model 
Formal Definitions Regarding the Perceptual Graph Model  
 
Definition 1. Recognized States 
A perceptual graph model of DM k has k’s set of recognized states. For each DM k ∈ N, let 
   ⊂  S be k’s set of recognized states; where    is formed by eliminating from S all states not 
visible to k. Note that    reflects k’s perception when some states in S are not apparent to all 
DMs in a model. Naturally, it is assumed that    = S if DM k recognizes all states in S, and  
   ≠ Ø where Ø is the empty set. 
Definition 2. Perceptual Graph Model 
DM k’s perceptual graph model, is   , is based upon   ; DM k’s perception of DMi’s state 
transitions   
 that are contained within Sk; and DM k’s perception of DM i’s relative preferences 
among states   
 . 
Let    be DM k’s index of awareness. When    = 0, then DM k is not aware that other DMs 
perceive different graph models; and when    = 1, then DM k is aware of states in his or her 
graph that are not perceived by other DMs.  
DM k’s perceptual graph model is denoted by    expressed by    = [N,   
   ∈  ,    
   ∈ , 
  
 
   ∈  ,   ], and a graph model system consists of a list of all DM’s perceptual graph 
models and is expressed by  ̂ = (G1,G2, . . . ,   , . . . ,   ), where i, k ∈ N:  
  
                                                                 DM k’s perception of i’s set of states; 
  
  ⊂     ×                                         DM k’s perception of i’s available state transitions; 
  
                                                         DM k’s perception of i’s relative preference information; 
                                                            DM k’s index of awareness.   
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Definition 3. Perceived Default Stability 
 For i ∈ N and k = i or k = j, a state s ∈    ∩    is perceived by k to be default stable for DM i iff 
there exists no unilateral move from s for i, i.e.,    (s) ∩    = Ø. 
 
Definition 4. Apparent Default Stability 
For i ∈ N, a state s ∈    is perceived by j to be an apparently default stable for 
DM i iff all unilateral moves away from s are inconspicuous to i, i.e.,    (s) ∩  
   = Ø and    (s) 
∩   
  ≠ Ø. It reflects the limited perception of a focal DM. 
Definition 5. Perceived Nash Stability  
For i ∈ N and k = i or k = j, a state s ∈    ∩    is perceived by k to be Nash stable for DM i, 
denoted by s ∈   
      , iff     (s) ∩    ∩     ≠ Ø and   
     ∩    = Ø. DM k perceives a state to 
be Nash stable for the focal DM i whenever k believes that there is no preferred state in    that 
i can move to;     (s) ∩   ≠ Ø is implied by    (s) ∩   ∩    ≠ Ø, so state s is neither perceived 
default nor apparently default stable, while the condition   
     ∩    = Ø ensures that there are 
no UIs for the focal DM i in   . Let   
      denote the set of states in    that are perceived to be 
apparently Nash stable for focal DM i. 
Definition 6. Apparent Nash Stability 
For i ∈ N, a state s ∈     is perceived by j to be apparently Nash stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈ 
  
       , iff     (s) ∩  
  ≠ Ø and   
     ∩     = Ø, but   
     ∩   
  ≠ Ø. Apparent Nash stability 
does not apply to the focal DM who owns the graph model, i.e., k = i, since DM i’s awareness 
would be equal to DM k’s. Therefore, apparent stability applies only for a focal DM with limited 
perception. 
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Definition 7. Perceived GMR Stability 
For i, j ∈ N and k = i or k = j, a state s ∈    ∩     is perceived by k to be GMR stable 
for DM i, denoted by s ∈   
    , iff   
    ∩     ≠ Ø and for every t ∈   
         there exists 
   (t) ∩   
         ≠ Ø. DM k perceives a state to be GMR stable for the focal DM i . 
Let   
     denote the set of states in     that are perceived to be GMR stable for focal DM i. 
 
Definition 8. GMR Strategic Advantage Instability 
 For i, j ∈ N, a state s ∈    is perceived by i to be GMR strategic advantage unstable for DM i, 
denoted by s ∈   
      , iff    
    ∩     ≠ Ø and there exists t ∈  
         such that    (t) ∩ 
  
         = Ø  but    (t) ∩   
        
 ≠ Ø.        
      denotes the set of states in    that 
are perceived to be GMR strategic advantage unstable for focal DM i. Strategic advantage 
instability reflects the opponent’s limited perception of the focal DM’s UIs or the sanctions to a 
UI.  
Definition 9. GMR Strategic Disadvantage Instability  
For i, j ∈ N, a state s ∈    is perceived by j to be GMR strategic disadvantage unstable for DM i, 
denoted by s ∈   
      ,, iff   
          and there exists t ∈   
        such that 
   (t) ∩   
         = Ø  but    (t) ∩   
        
 ≠ Ø. Here,   
       denotes the set of states in 
Sj that are perceived to be GMR strategic disadvantage unstable for focal DM i. 
Strategic disadvantage instability reflects the focal DM’s lack of perception of the opponent’s 
sanction. Thus, in   , DM j has sanctions to some of DM i’s UIs that are inconspicuous to DM i. 
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Definition 10. Perceived SMR Stability  
For i, j ∈ N, and k = i or k = j, a state s ∈    ∩     is perceived by k to be SMR stable 
for DM i, denoted by s ∈   
    , iff   
    ∩     ≠ Ø and for every t ∈   
         there exists 
   (t) ∩   
         ≠ Ø, and for all h ∈    (t) ∩   
         i (s)     ,    (h) ∩   
        = 
Ø .   
     denote the set of states in     that are perceived to be GMR stable for focal DM i. 
Definition 11. Perceived SEQ 
For i, j ∈ N, and k = i or k = j, a state s ∈    ∩     is perceived by k to be SEQ stable 
for DM i, denoted by s ∈   
    , iff   
    ∩     ≠ Ø and for every t ∈   
         there exists 
  
  (t) ∩   
         ≠ Ø. DM k perceives a state to be SEQ stable for the 
focal DM i when k believes that, if i takes advantage of any possible UI, DM j has a credible 
sanction [i.e., a state in   
  (t) ∩   
    ]. Therefore   
     denote the set of states in     that are 
perceived to be SEQ stable for focal DM i. 
 
Definition 12.Overall Stability 
 A state s ∈    is overall stable for DM k ∈ N under a particular solution concept iff s 
is stable for all DMs in k’s perceptual  graph model. Equilibrium and overall stability are 
synonyms in a standard graph model as they both refer to a state that is stable for all DMs under 
a particular solution concept. If      then state s is overall stable in     if it belongs to the set 
of commonly perceived states, i.e., s ∈   , and s is stable for both DMs, while if     , there is 
no restriction on the location of state s in   . 
Definition 13. Private Stability 
 A state s ∈    is privately stable for DM k ∈ N under a particular solution concept iff 
αk = 1, s ∈   
  and s is stable for k under that solution concept. 
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Definition 14. Equilibrium 
 A state s ∈    is an equilibrium under that solution concept iff for every i ∈ N and s ∈ 
  , s is overall stable for DM i under that solution concept. 
For a state to be an equilibrium, it must belong to the set of commonly perceived states    and 
be overall stable in every perceptual graph model. 
 
Definition 15. Pseudo- equilibrium 
 A state s ∈    is a pseudo - equilibrium under a particular solution concept iff s is overall stable 
for every DM i such that s ∈    for some but not all i ∈ N. The equilibrium (or 
pseudoequilibrium) of a state under a particular solution concept can be either stationary or 
transitory, depending on whether the state is consistently an equilibrium in all, or only some, 
variants of awareness. 
Definition 16. Stationary Equilibrium  
A state s ∈    is a stationary equilibrium under a particular solution concept iff s is an 
equilibrium in all variants of awareness in a perceptual graph system. 
Definition 17. Stationary Pseudo – equilibrium 
A state s ∈   that is a pseudo - equilibrium across all variants of awareness is a stationary 
pseudo - equilibrium state, which means that the state is overall stable in some but not all 
perceptual graph models, independent of the DM’s index of awareness, and not recognized by 
the other DMs. 
Definition 18. Transitory Equilibrium 
 A state s ∈    is a transitory equilibrium under a particular solution concept iff s is an 
equilibrium in some but not all variants of awareness. 
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Definition 19.Transitory Pseudo - equilibrium 
 A state s ∈   is a transitory pseudo - equilibrium iff s is a pseudo - equilibrium across some but 
not all variants of awareness. 
 
Figure B1. Infeasible States Elimination Using GMCRII Support System for Constructed Model 
in Chapter 4   
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Figure B2. Samples for Individual Stability Analysis for Model Proposed in Chapter 4 Using 
GMCR II Support System 
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Figure B3. Overall Stability Analysis for Model Proposed in Chapter 4 Using GMCR II 
Support System 
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